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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

The Idaho Education Network ("IEN") was created by the Idaho Legislature in 2008 to
provide a coordinated, statewide telecommunications distribution system for distance learning
for public schools. 1 The Department of Administration ("DOA") was given the responsibility to
develop the IEN by purchasing educational network and telecommunications services through
competitive bidding and by applying for federal program funds for its support.2 DOA issued a
Request for Proposals ("RFP") seeking "end-to-end" services for the IEN ("the IEN RFP") on
December 15, 2008. (Exhibits to Clerk's Record, Little Exhibits A-L ("Little Exhibits"), Exh. A,
pp. 21-22, RFP § 3.2; see also R. pp. 566-574, 568, Lowe Aff.,

~~

9-12; R. pp. 725-731, 726,

Little Aff. ,-r 3.) Syringa "teamed up" with prime contractor ENA whose proposal was ranked
highest. Qwest' s proposal was ranked second, but it got a statewide contract and Syringa got
nothing. This lawsuit is about corruption of the IEN competitive bidding process, the unlawful
split of the IEN contracts to favor Qwest and the damages Syringa sustained as a result.
Syringa is an Idaho telecommunications company.

Syringa entered into a Teaming

Agreement with ENA Services, LLC ("ENA"), a Tennessee company that specializes in
providing education network services, to compete for the IEN work. (R. pp. 568-569, Lowe
Affidavit~~

13-14; R. pp. 576-578, Teaming Agreement.) Under the terms of their agreement,

ENA assumed the lead role for preparation of the proposal with input and information, including

1
2

See Appendix to this brief, attaching 2008 Session Laws, ch. 260 (codified at LC.§ 67-57450).
See l.C. § 67-5745D(5)(a),(c) in 2008 Session Laws, ch. 260, Appendix.
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detailed pricing information, provided by Syringa. (R. pp. 576-577, Teaming Agreement§ 2; R.
pp. 1794-1795, Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7 - p. 95, L. 22; R. p. 1798, Lowe Depo., p. 175, LL. 3-19;

see also R. Conf. pp. 514-582, Johnsen Aff.)

The parties agreed that if the proposal was

successful, ENA would provide education network services as prime contractor and Syringa
would provide telecommunications services as primary supplier and subcontractor. (R. pp. 576577, Teaming Agreement§ 2; see also R. pp. 169-172, Executive Summary.)
The IEN Request for Proposals ("RFP") required each bidder to submit a technical
proposal and a cost proposal. The ENA proposal received the highest overall ranking.
The DOA announced, after completion of technical review and before review of the cost
proposals, that it would make a multiple award under Idaho Code § 67-5718A to ENA and to
second place Qwest Communications Co., LLC ("Qwest").

(R. p. 581, Letter of Intent.)

Identical statewide contracts for the Project were issued to ENA and Qwest on January 28, 2009
using state forms called Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders ("SBPOs") that incorporated the
RFP and the respective proposals of the contracting parties. (R. pp. 582-585.)
Twenty-nine (29) days after issuing the original SBPOs, the DOA issued amended
SBPOs based upon terms provided by Qwest. (R. pp. 586-593.) The amended SBPOs were no
longer identical; abandoned the "end-to-end" solution described in the RFP; and required ENA
to look exclusively to Qwest for IEN telecommunications services. The amended SBPOs split
the IEN Project into an educational network services component to be provided exclusively by
ENA and a telecommunications component to be provided exclusively by Qwest in violation of
the Idaho Code § 67-5718A requirement that contracts be issued to multiple bidders only for the
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same or similar services. (R. pp. 586-593.) ENA offered no objection to the amended SBPOs
and accepted the benefits of the amended contract.
A timeline showing the major IEN milestones between the December 15, 2008 Request
for Proposals and the February 26, 2009 amended SBPOs is located in the Clerk's Record on
Appeal at page 1262 and as Appendix 1 to this brief.
B.

Course of the Proceedings Below

Syringa sued the DOA to invalidate the amended SBPOs on the basis that they violate
Idaho Code § 67-5718A, sued ENA for breaching the Teaming Agreement and sued Qwest,
DOA chief information officer J. Michael Gwartney and chief technology officer Greg Zickau
for intentional interference with the Syringa/ENA contract and prospective economic advantage.
The district court entered two summary judgments. In the first, it ruled that Syringa was
barred from challenging the post-contract amendment of the IEN SPBOs because it failed to
exhaust administrative remedies under Idaho Code § 67-5733 when the amended SBPOs were
issued and accepted. (R. pp. 1655-1661, 1659, Memo. Dec. Re: Syringa Motion to Reconsider.)
In the second, the district court ruled that the contract between Syringa and ENA was not
enforceable. The district court also ruled that the amended SBPOs were unilaterally imposed by
DOA and that Syringa had not provided sufficient evidence of wrongful conduct to create an
issue of fact on its tort claims for intentional interference. (R. pp. 2555-2598, specifically pp.
2562-2563, 2592, 2595, Memo. Dec. Re: Motions for Summary Judgment.)
dismissing all claims was entered March 8, 2011. (R. pp. 2602-2604.)
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Judgment

The district court awarded costs and attorneys' fees to ENA and Qwest under Idaho Code

§ 12-120(3) and costs to the DOA, Mr. Gwartney and Mr. Zickau.
C.

Statement of Facts

Syringa provides over 1300 miles of fiber optic "backbone" to twelve rural Idaho
telephone companies that serve southern and eastern Idaho. (R. p. 382.) Each of these twelve
companies is a member/owner of Syringa. Syringa also provides telecommunications services to
cell phone companies, the Idaho Department of Transportation, the Idaho State Police and others.
(R. p. 383.)
1.

The Creation of the Idaho Education Network Project

The JEN legislation described the JEN as a "coordinated, statewide telecommunications
distribution system for distance learning for each public school, including two-way interactive
video, data, internet access and other telecommunications services for providing distance
leaming". 3
The telecommunications distribution system described in the IEN legislation is mostly a
cabled and wired system. These cables and wires are like a highway system with freeways,
secondary highways and roads. The freeways on a telecommunications distribution system have
a large capacity, called bandwidth, while the secondary highways and roads usually have a
smaller capacity that eventually funnels down, at the "last mile" to an actual user connection.
The federal government recognized the benefits of fostering internet access for education
and created the telecommunications industry funded Universal Service Fund in 1996. This fund
3

See LC. § 67-5745D(2) in 2008 Session Laws, ch. 260, Appendix.
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provides support for internet based programs for schools and libraries through what is commonly
referred to as "E-Rate funding". (R. pp. 2556-2557, Memo. Dec. Re: Motions for Summary
Judgment.) State programs using qualified E-Rate service providers can receive funding from
the E-Rate program. The IEN was created to be such a program.
Federal E-Rate funding was available for qualified schools and libraries through the IEN
for the 2009 fiscal year.

That funding was conditioned, however, on competitive bidding

involving the issuance of an RFP, the selection of the "most cost effective service offering" by a
single, qualified E-Rate provider, compliance with all applicable FCC, state and local
procurement/competitive bidding requirements and the filing of a Form 471 E-Rate Application
Services Ordered and Certification Form ("E-Rate Application") with the Universal Service
Administrative Company ("USAC") no later than February 12, 2009. (Little Exhibits, Exh. D,
p. 27, Key Milestones; R. Conf. p. 285, Hill to RFP Review Panel.) The schedule was tight and
failure to select an E-Rate provider and file the E-Rate Application with USAC by February 12,
2009 could have resulted in a loss of funding for the year.
2.

DOA Chief Gwartney Threatens Syringa Over CEO Comment

Greg Lowe became Syringa's CEO in September, 2008.

Mr. Lowe met with Jason

Kreizenbeck, Chief of Staff for Governor Otter on December 4, 2008. During the course of that
meeting, which occurred before the IEN RFP was issued by DOA, Mr. Lowe expressed his
opinion that the state "should do an inventory to insure no overbuilds were done by any carrier"
in connection with the IEN.

Mr. Lowe's remark to Mr. Kreizenbeck was prompted by his

concern that JEN public funds might be used to duplicate services that already existed and
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provide a competitive advantage to the prevailing vendor in the private market.

(R. pp. 1123-1129, l l 24; 1167-1173, 1168, Amended Third Aff. of Lowe i-!i-1 l-5.)
Mr. Gwartney confronted Mr. Lowe four days later before a DOA meeting concerning
the JEN with ENA and Syringa. Mr. Gwartney, who was irate, pulled Mr. Lowe aside and
demanded that he "keep his opinions to himself." Mr. Gwartney also told Mr. Lowe that if he
didn't keep his criticisms to himself, he would "make sure Syringa would never get any of the
IEN business." (R. pp. 1124, 1168, Amended Third Aff. of Lowe i-!i-11-5.)

3.

The DOA Request for Proposals Seeks an End-to-End Solution

JEN competitive bidding began with the publication of the IEN RFP.

An RFP is a

document that tells vendors what the state wants to buy. In the case of the IEN RFP, the State
indicated "that highest consideration will be given to the Partner or Partners presenting the best
and most cost effective total end-to-end service support solution."

(Little Exhibits, Exh. A,

pp. 21-22, RFP § 3.2.) The RFP also stated that comprehensive and binding schedules were
required for all services (Little Exhibits, Exh. A, pp. 32-33, RFP §§ 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.2), and that
prices were required to be provided on a per unit basis (Little Exhibits, Exh. A, pp. 33, 47,
RFP §§ 6.1.2 and 10.0).
The RFP contained multiple appendices that described each of the components of the
project for which proposals were sought. When asked by a vendor whether proposals would be
accepted for less than the entire "end-to-end" solution described in the RFP, the DOA rejected
the idea of splitting the project into pieces by answering:
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As stated in the RFP, ... the State desires to partner with a total
service solutions provider. Vendors interested in bidding on a
particular section of the RFP are highly encouraged to work with a
major service provider partner or partners, in an effort to meet all of
the required specifications as set forth in this document.
(Little Exhibits, Exh. E, pp. 15-16, RFP "A-15".) Special Instructions that incorporated the State
of Idaho Standard Contract Terms and Conditions and that stated, in item 9, "Award will be
ALL-OR-NONE based on grand total of extended unit price bid" accompanied the RFP. (See
Little Exhibits, Exh. B, p. 2; Exh. C, p. 2; Exh. D, p. 3; Exh. E, p. 3; and Exh. F, p. 3.) The RFP
also stated, in apparent contradiction, that contracts might be awarded to multiple bidders.
(Little Exhibits, Exh. E, pp. 10, 18, RFP "A-1" and RFP "A-25".) The RFP did not say the IEN
award or contracts would be "split".
Most purchases by the State of Idaho are made from the single, lowest responsible bidder.

See LC. § 67-5717(1), (2) and (3). The one statutory exception to this rule allows the state,
where "necessary," to purchase the "same or similar property" from multiple bidders under one
of three specific conditions. These conditions are: 1) that it be necessary to have more than one
contractor to furnish the type and quantity of property required; 2) that it be necessary to have
more than one contractor to provide expeditious and cost-effective acquisition, or 3) that it be
necessary to have more than one contractor to enable state agencies to acquire property that is
compatible with previously acquired property.
In recognition of the exceptional nature of multiple awards, Idaho purchasing law
requires the Purchasing Administrator, "where more than one (1) contractor is necessary to
furnish the same or similar property," to make a written determination that one or more of the
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statutory conditions have been satisfied before contracts can be awarded to multiple bidders.
The required advance written determination was not made for the IEN contracts. (R. Conf.
p. 322, Vandenberg 7/31/09 Memo.; see also R. Conf. p. 286, Bums 2/22/10 Memo.)
The IEN RFP had two parallel components.

The first component was for the

construction and maintenance of the IEN that would provide service to Idaho schools and
libraries eligible for federal E-Rate funding support. (Little Exhibits, Exh. A, pp. 21-22, 25, RFP
§§ 3.2, 3.5.3.)

The second component was for the construction and maintenance of a

telecommunications system for state agencies that do not receive federal E-Rate support. The
component not involving E-Rate funding was called IdaNet. (Little Exhibits, Exh. A, p. 34,
RFP § 7.1.) The IEN and IdaNet components could be divided "vertically" to allow multiple
contracts for the same or similar end-to-end service. (R. Conf. pp. 434-435, Lowe Depo., p. 138,
L. 10 -p. 143, L. 6.)

They could not be split "horizontally" without violating Idaho Code

§ 67-5718A.

Finally, Section 4.1 of the RFP described a two stage evaluation process for the IEN
proposals. The Technical Proposals were to be evaluated and scored first by a team of evaluators
based on evaluation criteria contained in the RFP. The results of that technical evaluation were
then to be forwarded to the Division of Purchasing for review and validation. After validating
the Technical Evaluation scores, the Division of Purchasing was to open and score the Cost
Proposals. After scoring the Cost Proposals, the technical scores and cost scores were to be
added together to identify the Apparent Successful Bidder.
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4.

Syringa and ENA Team Up to Provide the End-to-End Solution

ENA is a highly experienced company that specializes in providing managed network
and telecommunications services to technology-enabled education customers, including K-12
schools and libraries. ENA also has a depth of experience managing projects involving federal
E-Rate funding.

ENA does not, however, provide telecommunications services in Idaho.

(R.pp.1807-1808, Lowe Depo., p.60, L.21 -p.61, L.21.) Syringa's agreement to provide
IEN telecommunication services was essential to ENA's response to the IEN RFP.

(Little

Exhibits, Exh. E, pp. 15-16.)
Knowing that a contract could result from the RFP process, Syringa and ENA defined
their relationship and the conditions under which Syringa would provide telecommunication
services as a subcontractor to ENA in a written contract they signed before ENA submitted a
response to the IEN RFP. They called that contract the Teaming Agreement. 4
The Teaming Agreement detailed ENA's and Syringa's respective obligations with
respect to (I) submitting a responsive bid (or "Proposal" as defined in the Teaming Agreement)
and (2) the services each would provide if the ENA Proposal resulted in a state contract. The
language of the Teaming Agreement was both detailed and imperative, signaling the parties'
intent to be bound to one another not only for the preparation and submission of technical and
cost proposals in response to the IEN RFP, but also to perform any resulting state contract.
Paragraph 2(c) of the Teaming Agreement assigned the lead role for preparing the IEN Proposal
to ENA and required Syringa to provide "such input, review and information into the Proposal as
4

See Appendix to this brief, attaching the Teaming Agreement.
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is required to complete all required elements of the Request for Proposal." (R. p. 576.) The
ENA proposal described the agreed delegation of responsibility in similar fashion by stating that
"ENA will be the contracting entity (and) serve as the prime contractor for the project with
Syringa as the principal partner and prime supplier". (R. p. 169; see also R. p. 163.)
Paragraphs 2(d), (e), (f), and (g) assigned the lead role for external communications
regarding the Project to ENA, prohibited participation in competing Proposals without the
written consent of the other party, prohibited contracts or future arrangements relating to the
Project without written approval, and required the parties to maintain confidentiality.
Paragraph 2(h) identified specific events that would terminate the Teaming Agreement.
Paragraph 2(a) of the Teaming Agreement stated that in the event ENA or Syringa was
awarded a Prime Contract, ENA and Syringa "shall" enter into a service agreement pursuant to
which Syringa shall provide connectivity services to ENA.

Paragraph 2(b) of the Teaming

Agreement reiterated the parties' agreement that Syringa would "provide the connectivity
services in connection with the Project" if ENA was awarded a Prime Contract. Section 3 of the
Teaming Agreement contained the material terms of the service agreement. If ENA won a Prime
Contract, it was to be responsible for IEN management, content and E-Rate.

Syringa was

required provide the telecommunications backbone for all the services of the IEN, to provide a
network operations center and to share responsibility with ENA for procuring, managing and
provisioning actual connections to users (sometimes described as "last mile circuits").
The price to be paid Syringa for its services was determined when Syringa provided ENA
with fixed prices, as required by Section2(c) of the Teaming Agreement. (R. pp.1794-1795,
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Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7 -p. 95, L. 22; 1797-1801, Lowe Depo, p. 174, L. 21 -p. 178, L. 7;
R. Conf. pp. 514-582.) These prices were, in turn relied upon and used by ENA to formulate the
total price it submitted in the ENA Cost Proposal in response to the RFP. (R. Conf. pp. 139-141;
R. pp. 1502-1534.)

ENA accepted Syringa's pricing by submission of the ENA Proposal

(R. pp. 163-164) and Cost Proposal (R. pp. 1502-1534).
ENA and Syringa knew from the RFP that some state contract form provisions would
impact their service agreement. As a result, they agreed that their service agreement would
include any "required flow-down provisions or other appropriate terms similar to those set forth
in the Prime Contract." (R. pp. 577-578, Teaming Agreement § 3(c); R. pp. 1794-1795, Lowe
Depo., p. 94, L. 7 -p. 95, L. 22; 1797-1801, Lowe Depo., p. 174, L. 21 -p. 178, L. 7.) The
business logos of ENA and Syringa appeared on all but the signature page of the proposal which
was executed solely by ENA. (See Little Exhibits, Exh. G.)
The Teaming Agreement and the conduct of the parties after execution of the Teaming
Agreement support the conclusion that ENA and Syringa shared a clear, mutual understanding
concerning the performance required of each associated with the submission of a response to the
IEN RFP, the criteria by which their respective performance could be measured, and that they
intended to form a binding contract. The Teaming Agreement and the conduct of the parties also
support the conclusion that the parties further agreed on the material terms of a service
agreement for the provision of connectivity services by Syringa to ENA and the IEN Project if
ENA received a Prime Contract.
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5.

The ENA Proposal Receives the Highest Score

Proposals in response to the IEN RFP were submitted by Qwest, ENA (with Syringa
identified as its principal contractor pursuant to the Teaming Agreement), Verizon, and Integra
Communications. (R. p. 1500.) After brief review for satisfaction of submission requirements,
the technical proposals were submitted to six technical evaluators for review.
The technical evaluation took three days to complete. The evaluators met with the DOA
and delivered their evaluations on the fourth day which was Friday, January 16, 2009. (R. Conf.
p. 285.) The scores given by each of the individual evaluators were tallied that day while the
evaluators were present.

DOA employees Mark Little and Laura Hill scored the pricing

proposals later that evening. (R. Conf. p. 87, Hill Depo., p. 89, LL. 4-25.)
The ENA proposal received the highest score from the technical evaluators.
6.

DOA Announces a Multiple Award that Includes Qwest Before it
Knows Whose Bid is Lowest

DOA Purchasing Manager Mark Little announced to the technical evaluators
immediately after the technical scoring was completed that a multiple award would be made to
Qwest and to ENA. (R. Conf. pp. 124-125, Hough Depo., p. 26, L. 23 - p. 31, L. 18.) Mr. Little
had no authority to make the decision to issue a multiple award. (R. Conf. p. 121, Little Depo. p.
122, L. 14 - p. 123, L. 7; see also l.C. § 67-5718A(2); R. Conf. p. 390, Little Depo., p. 50, L. 10 p. 51, L.25; R. Conf. p. 399, Little Depo., p. 126, LL. 3-20.) Moreover, the cost proposals had
not been scored before Mr. Little made his announcement. (R. Conf. p. 87, Hill Depo., p. 87, L.
11 - p. 89, L. 25.) Mr. Little's lack of authority and his announcement that a multiple award
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would be made before their cost proposals had been evaluated support an inference that Mr.
Little knew a multiple award would be made before the proposals were evaluated.
ENA received the highest technical and cost scores overall and the second highest IdaNet (Non-E-Rate) subcategory cost score of 74. Qwest, on the other hand, received the second
place score in all categories except the non-E-Rate cost subcategory on which it received the
highest score of 100. (R. p. 581, Letter of Intent.) The ENA cost proposal offered a Monthly
Recurring Charge of $571,000.00.
Charge of $854,215.64.

The Qwest cost proposal offered a Monthly Recurring

(R. pp. 566-593, at 572-573, Lowe Affidavit.) Had there been no

multiple award, ENA was the clear winner and, according to Section 4.1 of the RFP, the
"apparent successful bidder." (Little Exhibits, Exh. A, pp. 27-28.)
7.

Gwartney, Zickau and Luna Take the First Step to Give IEN
Telecommunications to Qwest

The results of the technical and cost evaluations were given to DOA employees Greg
Zickau and Teresa Luna on the evening of January 16, 2009.

Teresa Luna, by her own

admission, has no telecommunications technical knowledge or skill. (R. Conf. p. 385, Luna
Depo., p. 94, LL. 4-23.) Mr. Zickau, on the other hand, is technically knowledgeable, but did not
participate in the evaluation process. (R. Conf. pp. 394-395, Little Depo., p. 105, L. 16 - p. 107,
L. 4.) Neither Ms. Luna nor Mr. Zickau had, by that time, read the IEN RFP or the responses to
the IEN RFP.
Informed only by a report from Mark Little and Laura Hill (who also hadn't read the RFP
responses), Ms. Luna and Mr. Zickau telephoned Mr. Gwartney. Mr. Gwartney, Ms. Luna and
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Mr. Zickau have testified that they agreed, during that telephone conversation, that a multiple
award would be made to ENA and to Qwest. Mr. Zickau, who attended the meeting with the
technical evaluators for about 15 minutes, testified he recommended an award to Qwest and
ENA on the recommendation of Mark Little, Laura Hill and "one of the evaluators." (R. Conf.
p. 108, Zickau Depo., p. 178, L. 8 - p. 179, L. 11.)
Mr. Little testified by affidavit filed March 19, 2010, that, "It was the evaluators'
recommendation that the contract be awarded to both ENA and Qwest." (R. p. 729, Little Aff.
~

14.) The technical evaluators were not, however, asked to provide a recommendation whether

a multiple award should be made, lacked financial information to evaluate and made no such
recommendation. (R. Conf. pp. 124-125, Hough Depo., p. 26, L. 3 - p. 31, L. 23; R. Conf. p.
129, Gaines Depo., p. 82, L. 23 -p. 83, L. 12; R. Conf. p. 131, Reininger Depo., p. 74, L. 14 -p.
77, L. 2; R. Conf. p. 138, Finke Depo., p. 22, L. 1 - p. 25, L. 18; R. Conf. p. 134, Gravette
Depo., p. 24, L. 17 - p. 25, L. 24; R. Conf. pp. 123-138.)
Mr. Gwartney testified that he understood during the January 16, 2009 telephone call that
an award would be made to Qwest and ENA in the first volume of his deposition on September
2, 2010. (R. Conf. p. 91, Gwartney Depo., p. 154, L. 22 - p. 155, L. 8.) He also testified that he
knew, at the time, that ENA would provide E-Rate services and Qwest would be "making the
connections and providing the broadband." (R. Conf. pp. 90-92, p. 153, L. 8 - p. 160, L. 8.) Mr.
Gwartney said essentially the same thing in the second volume of his deposition on December 2,
2010. (R. Conf. p. 371, Gwartney Depo., p. 259, L. 13 - p. 261, L. 19.) Mr. Gwartney later
repudiated his prior testimony, stating that he "misspoke" and that "there was no detail about
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who was going to do what" in the January 16, 2009 post-evaluation telephone conversation. (R.
Conf. pp. 371-372, Gwartney Depo., p. 262, L. 8 - p. 263, L. 23.)
Notably, Mr. Gwartney's "misspoken" testimony is consistent with the testimony of
Qwest employee Clint Berry who testified, "I knew all along we (Qwest) were going to be
providing connectivity." (R. Conf. p. 440, Berry Depo., p. 163, L. 5 - p. 165, L. 12.) It is also
consistent with Mr. Little's announcement to the evaluators on January 16, 2009 and creates a
material issue of fact whether Mr. Gwartney knew and intended that Qwest would be the
exclusive provider for IEN telecommunication services from the beginning.
8.

DOA Issues a Notice of Award to Qwest and ENA

On January 20, 2009, the DOA sent a Letter oflntent (aka Notice of Award) notifying the
bidders that an award would be made to ENA and to Qwest. The letter does not reveal "who
would do what", does not reveal that Mr. Gwartney already knew that ENA and Qwest would
provide different services and that Qwest would "dig the holes and put the cables in."
(R. Conf. p. 91, Gwartney Depo., p. 157, LL. 16-17.)
All ENA and Syringa knew on January 20, 2009 was that the RFP had said multiple
awards could be made for the end-to-end solution. (R. p. 2536, p. 136, LL. 5-23; R. pp. 25392540.) Neither ENA nor Syringa knew, at the time, that Mr. Gwartney had already concluded
that Qwest would provide telecommunication services for the IEN in violation of Idaho Code
§ 67-5718A. There was no reason, based on the information contained in the RFP and the
January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent, for either Qwest or ENA to protest the award, described in the
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Letter of Intent, or for Syringa to be concerned that it was going to be excluded from the IEN
Project.
9.

DOA Issues Virtually Identical Undivided Contracts For The Project
to Qwest and ENA

On January 28, 2009, after the I.C. § 67-5733 appeal period had expired, the Division of
Purchasing issued virtually identical SBPOs for the IEN Project. One of these, SBPO 1308,
went to Qwest. (R. pp. 582-583.) The other, SBPO 1309, went to ENA. (R. pp. 584-585.) Both
SBPOs covered the entire IEN Project and contained the same scope of work language:
Contract for the Idaho Education Network (IEN) per State of Idaho
RFP 2160 for the benefit of State of Idaho schools, agencies,
institutions, and departments and eligible political subdivisions or
public agencies as defined by Idaho code, Section 67-2327.
Both SBPOs complied with Idaho Code § 67-5718A because they were issued for the
entire IEN Project, could accommodate "vertical" end-to end solutions, and were for the "same
or similar" property. (R. Conf. pp. 96-97, Bums Depo., p. 62, L. 24 - p. 69, L. 6.) So long as the
SBPOs complied with I.C. § 67-5718A, the state could purchase some, none or all of the IEN
services from either Qwest or ENA. (R. p. 1837, Zickau Depo., p. 53, LL. 7 - 25; R. p. 1839,
Zickau Depo., p. 99, LL. 8-20; R. Conf. p. 97, Bums Depo., p. 66, L. 24 - p. 69, L. 6.) The
original SBPOs allowed competition as contemplated by I.C. § 67-5718A.
The plain language of SBPO 1309 issued to ENA on January 28, 2009 states that it is a
contract, saying "Contract for the Idaho Education Network (IEN) per State of Idaho
RFP 2160 ... ".

(R. pp. 584-585, SBPO 1309.)

SBPO 1309 to ENA was, in fact, a Prime

Contract for the purchase of services described in the IEN RFP.
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10.

With Two Identical Contracts for the Same Project in Place, DOA,
Qwest and ENA Attend Multiple Meetings Between January 28 and
February 26, 2009 That No One Can Remember

The IEN SBPOs issued on January 28, 2009 made no task assignments and were
potentially available for the use of regionally based purchase orders or for a vertical division of
IEN services by one contractor and IdaNet services by the other. But that is not what happened.
Instead, a series of meetings preceded an unlawful split of the project into two separate, amended
contracts for dissimilar services. The first meeting involved DOA, Qwest and ENA. The second
meeting involved the same three and the Albertson's Foundation which had expressed interest in
providing funding for the IEN. The rest of the meetings were separate and held behind closed
doors with DOA and Qwest, DOA and ENA, or Qwest and ENA.
The record concerning this time period is marked by epidemic failures of memory, blank
calendars, conflicts in testimony and the deletion of files from Mr. Gwartney's laptop. (See
D.2.d., infra.) Nonetheless, two significant sequences of conduct appear.
The first sequence begins with the January 29, 2009 IEN Strategic Implementation Plan
and concludes with an email from Greg Zickau at the end of the working day on February 6,
2009 stating that no decision had yet been made concerning which contractor (Qwest or ENA)
would be designated on the state's E-Rate Application. The second sequence begins after hours
on February 6, 2009 at the Bitter Creek Pub where contrary to Mr. Zickau's email, Teresa Luna
gave advance notice to Qwest Lobbyist Ed Lodge and Qwest employees Jim Schmit and Clint
Berry that ENA would be the designated E-Rate provider.
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11.

Gwartney Announces He Will "Run Things" as DOA and Qwest Start
to Interfere With the Syringa/ENA Teaming Agreement Between
January 28 and February 6, 2009

The first post-contract IEN meeting involving ENA, Qwest and DOA was called by Mr.
Zickau and occurred in Mr. Gwartney's office on January 30, 2009. (R. Conf. p. 202, Zickau
email, 1128/09.) This meeting followed an earlier meeting that day involving only Mr. Gwartney
and Qwest employee Jim Schmit. Neither meeting is reflected on Mr. Gwartney's calendar, but
they are described in an email from ENA representative Bob Collie to Syringa CEO Greg Lowe
who had not been present. Mr. Collie reported the following in a June 30 email to Mr. Lowe:
Gwartney made it clear that he'd be running things and that he wanted
ENA and Qwest to get together and come to an amicable solution to
how we all might execute. Qwest is definitely on the defensive and
wants much more. Jim Schmit was noticeably frustrated both due to a
meeting he had prior with Gwartney and what the document said.
Skip had a meeting earlier in the week with Gwartney and said that
the biggest impediment to get this to move forward is for Gwartney to
get Qwest nodding and agreeing with what needs to be done. It
appears that Gwartney has begun this process, but I am certain there
will be more required to accomplish the task.
All of this being said, however, together we've quite a bit to do to get
this overall relationship with Qwest shaped in the best manner for our
partnership. We're planning to meet with Qwest first thing on
Monday in person to try and hear them out now that the attached
document has been circulated.
(R. Conf. p. 144.) Mr. Gwartney testified that he doesn't recall the meetings in his office on

January 30, 2009.

(R. Conf. pp. 374-375, Gwartney Depo., p. 283, L. 25 - p. 286, L. 18.)

Mr. Zickau remembers meetings occurring, but has no recollection what took place at the
meetings. (R. Conf. p. 110, Zickau Depo., p. 272, L. 6 - p. 275, L. 6.)
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The document attached to Mr. Co11ie's email was a Strategic Implementation Plan dated
January 29, 2009. (R. Conf. pp. 188-199.) This plan mentions that Syringa will provide IEN
connectivity.

(R. Conf. p. 190.) The January 29, 2009 Strategic Implementation Plan also

acknowledges the existence of a "partnership" between ENA and Syringa. (R. Conf. p. 195.)
Mr. Zickau sent an email to Qwest and ENA the day after the January 30, 2009 meeting
in Mr. Gwartney's office announcing, at the request of Qwest, that future meetings with DOA
would be conducted separately. (R. Conf. p. 168, Zickau email, 1/31/09; R. Conf. p. 110, Zickau
Depo., p. 275, LL. 7-24.)
ENA assumed the lead role for communications for the IEN Project as agreed in
Paragraph 2(d) of the Teaming Agreement and communicated regularly with the DOA after
issuance of the IEN SBPOs. ENA representative Mr. Collie was not clear concerning the dates
he discussed the Teaming Agreement with members of the DOA, but remembers that he showed
a copy of the Teaming Agreement to Laura Hill before she left state employment on February
12, 2009. (R.Conf.p.103, Collie Depo., p.178, L.10-p. 179, L.17; R. Conf.p.415, Hill
Depo., p. 18, L. 8 - p. 19, L. 11.) Mr. Zickau learned about the existence of the ENA/Syringa
Teaming Agreement from Laura Hill in January, 2009. (R. Conf. p. 106, Zickau Depo., p. 91,
L. 1 - p. 92, L. 7.) Mr. Collie also discussed the Teaming Agreement "in detail" with Mr.
Gwartney and Teresa Luna before ENA was directed to use Qwest exclusively for IEN
connectivity. (R. Conf. p. 103, Collie Depo., p. 179, L. 18 - p. 181, L. 21.)
The record contains little other information concerning the meetings that took place
concerning the IEN after January 29, 2009 however, because, with the exception of one fact
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concerning Ms. Luna's February 6, 2009 meeting at the Bitter Creek Pub, neither Mr. Zickau nor
Ms. Luna have any recolle<.iion concerning the meetings.

(R. Conf. p. 110, Zickau Depo.,

p.272, L.6 -p. 275, L.11; R. Conf.p.111, Zickau Depo., p.299, LL.1-7; R. Conf.p.112,
Zickau Depo., p. 302, LL. 10-13; R. Conf. p. 113, Zickau Depo., p. 304, LL. 13-18, p. 304, L. 22
- p. 306, L. 7; R. Conf. p. 116, Luna Depo., p. 96, L. 10 - p. 97, L. 22.)
12.

Qwest Receives Early, Ex Parle Notice at the Bitter Creek Pub on
February 6, 2009 that ENA will be Designated E-Rate Provider and
Drafts an Amended SBPO for DOA

February 12, 2009 was the deadline for filing the state's E-Rate application.

(Little

Exhibits, Exh. D, p. 27.) Although DOA decided on or before February 6, 2009 that ENA was
going to be the designated provider on the state's E-Rate form, the official position provided to
the IEN contractors by e-mail from Greg Zickau at 7:58 p.m. on Friday, February 6 was that no
selection had yet been made. Foreshadowing the exclusion of Syringa by the amended SBPOs,
Mr. Zickau' s email to ENA and Qwest that evening told them to "work out" pricing in the same
fashion as ENA and Syringa had accomplished for the response to the RFP, saying:
Regardless of who is the listed service provider, the services we want
and need from our respective providers remain the same. And,
regardless of who is the listed service provider, pricing has to be
worked out between Qwest and ENA . . . The pricing for each school
must incorporate and reflect the total service we expect to receive
from Qwest and the total service we expect to receive from ENA.
Period. We know that you will each bear in mind pricing in the RFP
responses as you work on this.
(R. Conf. pp. 111-113, Zickau Depo., p. 299, L. 23 - p. 304, L. 9; R. Conf. pp. 171-172, 173,

183-184.)
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Qwest knew that ENA was going to be the designated IEN E-Rate provider before
Mr. Zickau's e-mail was sent.

Qwest knew because Teresa Luna asked Qwest lobbyist Ed

Lodge to arrange a meeting late in the day on February 6 with Qwest employees Jim Schmit and
Clint Berry.

(R. Conf. p. 441, Berry Depo., p. 167, L. 3 - p. 169, L. 18.) Ms. Luna told

Mr. Lodge, Mr. Schmit and Mr. Berry that ENA had been chosen as the IEN E-Rate provider
when she met with them at the Bittercreek Pub after 5:00 p.m. that day. Ms. Luna described the
meeting in an email to Mr. Zickau the next day, saying:
I had a very long and I think very productive meeting with Qwest on
Friday afternoon. I will fill you in on the details on Monday, but we
made enough progress to move forward with the letter and with an
amendment to the contract stipulating the duties that each of our
vendors will be in charge of.
(R. Conf. pp. 171-172, Luna email.) Ms. Luna does not recall what "letter" she was referring to
and does not recall any discussion concerning the "amendment to the contract that would specify
the duties for each contractor" that she mentioned in her email. (R. Conf. p. 117, Luna Depo., p.
108, L. 19 - p. 109, L. 18.) Ms. Luna remembers only that she, Mr. Schmit, Mr. Berry and Mr.
Lodge discussed selection of ENA as the designated IEN E-Rate provider. (R. Conf. p. 117,
Luna Depo., p. 106, L. 25 - p. 108, L. 4.)
Teresa Luna, Laura Hill and Greg Zickau met in an unscheduled meeting on short notice
at Qwest's request with Qwest employees Clint Berry and Jim Schmit the following Monday
afternoon February 9, 2009. (R. Conf. p. 118, Luna Depo., p. 114, L. 9 - p. 117, L. 22; R. Conf.
pp. 147-155; R. Conf. p. 105, Zickau Depo., p. 76, L. 2 - p. 77, L. 11; R. Conf. p. 113, Zickau
Depo., p. 304, L. 10 - p. 306, L. 4.) The next day, February 10, 2009, Clint Berry e-mailed a
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proposed SBPO amendment ("the Qwest Amendment") to "Teresa, Laura and Greg" that
identified ENA as the E-Rate service provider and, for the first time, designated Qwest as the
general contractor for IEN and IdaNet internet technical services. (R. Conf. pp. 147-155.) The
Qwest Amendment split the IEN Project into two contracts for dissimilar services in violation of
LC.§ 67-5718A.
Clint Berry and ENA employee Bob Collie met that same day to discuss pricing and the
provision of services to the IEN. (R. Conf. p. 166, Miller email; R. Conf. p. 156, Berry email.)
ENA and Qwest were both under contract with DOA at the time pursuant to the original SBPOs
that covered the entire IEN Project. (R. pp. 582-585.) There is no evidence that Mr. Collie told
Syringa he was engaged in pricing discussions with Qwest the week of February 9, 2009 and no
evidence that ENA asked for Syringa' s assistance or written permission to work with Qwest. (R.
Conf. p. 474, Collie Depo., p. 306, LL. 7 - 15.) ENA breached Paragraph 2(e) of the Teaming
Agreement by the meeting of February 10, 2009 and the events that followed it. (R. p. 576.)

13.

ENA is Designated as the IEN E-Rate Provider on the E-Rate
Application on February 12, 2009

Laura Hill was responsible for completing the E-Rate Application and for drafting
amendments to the IEN SBPOs before she left her job with the state on February 12, 2009. The
E-Rate Application submitted by her that day designated ENA as the E-Rate service provider and
stated that a monthly recurring charge of $571,000.00 was "the most cost-effective means of
meeting educational needs and technology plan goals".
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(R. Conf. pp. 299-301.)

The

$571,000.00 monthly recurring charge came directly from the ENA proposal which was based
on Syringa pricing for backbone and network connectivity. (R. pp. 566-593, at 572-573.)

14.

Qwest Pressures ENA to Subcontract with Qwest

The record does not reveal when ENA learned that it would be the designated IEN ERate provider. It does, however, reveal that ENA learned later than Qwest because Qwest sent
multiple communications to the DOA between February 6 and 12, 2009 in which it argued, in
response to the inside information received Friday evening from Teresa Luna, that Qwest should
be the designated provider. These communications noted, among other things, that Qwest would
be a better choice because "ENA does have a contract with Syringa" and proposed that ENA
should become a subcontractor to Qwest. (R. Conf. pp. 147-155, at 149) (emphasis in original).
Qwest employee Clint Berry proposed, in a meeting with Bob Collie on February 10,
2009, that ENA withdraw and become a subcontractor to Qwest. (R. Conf. p. 442, Berry Depo.,
p. 292, L. 12 - p. 293, L. 18.) At the time he made this proposal, Mr. Berry knew that ENA had
not been advised that the state had chosen to designate it as the E-Rate service provider.
(R. Conf. p. 443, Berry Depo., p. 294, L. 6 - p. 296, L. 22.) Following up on the meeting by

email later in the day, Mr. Berry misrepresented to Mr. Collie that the DOA was still
"considering" listing ENA as the sole E-Rate provider, identified "questions and concerns"
raised by the Qwest legal and finance teams and reiterated the Qwest proposal that ENA become
a subcontractor to Qwest. Mr. Berry then wrote that "if E).l"A were to withdraw and enter into a
Qwest Professional Services Agreement that may answer a few of these concerns as well as help
with the Teaming Agreement you have with Syringa Networks."
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He closed the email by

thanking Mr. Collie for "agreeing to seek input from [ENA's]

semor leadership."

(R. Conf. p. 156.)

15.

The Two Identical IEN Contracts Are Split into Contracts for
Dissimilar Services By Amended SBPOs Excluding Syringa

Amended IEN SBPOs stating Qwest and ENA were to act as "equal partners
and that Qwest was "the general contractor for all IEN technical network services" were issued
by DOA on February 26, 2009. (R. p. 588.) A redline comparison of the Qwest Amendments
with the executed amended SBPOs supports a reasonable inference that the Qwest Amendment
was used as the template for preparation of the amended SBPOs. (R. Conf. pp. 302-306, 484.)
Laura Hill, who was responsible for preparation of the amended SBPOs denies using the Qwest
Amendment and says she prepared the amended SBPOs at the direction of Deputy Attorney
General Melissa Vandenberg. (R. Conf. pp. 422-423, Hill Depo., p. 176, L. 9 - p. 179, L. 16.)
Miss Vandenberg, however, denies she directed Laura Hill to prepare the amended SBPOs. (R.
Conf. pp. 463-464, Vandenberg Depo., p. 114, L. 11 - p. 117, L. 10; p. 122, L. 10 - p. 124, L.
13.) Whether the Qwest Amendment was a template for the amended SBPOs is a disputed
question of fact.
Mr. Gwartney has some recollection concerning the evolution of the Strategic
Implementation Plans, including discussions about Syringa providing east-west connectivity and
Qwest providing north-south connectivity, but denies choosing Qwest.
Gwartney Depo., p. 314, LL. 1-15.)

(R. Conf. p. 379,

When asked why Qwest was designated as the sole

contractor for connectivity, he deferred to the "team" led by Mr. Zickau that included Ms. Hill,
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Mr. Little and Deputy Attorney General Melissa Vandenberg. (R. Conf. pp. 379-380, Gwartney
Depo., p. 314, L. 16 - p. 316, L. 7.) The "team" however, was essentially Mr. Zickau by himself
because Mr. Little says he wasn't involved, Ms Hill testified she didn't attend any meetings with
the contractors concerning the Plans and Ms. Vandenberg testified she reviewed the language of
the amended SBPOs, but was never consulted about the multiple award or the legality of the
amended SBPOs. (R. p. 2465, Vandenberg Depo., p. 26, L. 10

p. 27, L. 18.)

Mr. Zickau testified that DOA decided not to purchase services for the IEN from Syringa
because Mr. Collie stated that Syringa would not share participation in the IEN or IdaNet.
(R. pp. 1847-1851, Zickau Depo., p. 282, L. 8 - p. 286, L. 22; R. Conf. p. 106, Zickau Depo.,
p. 90, L. 11 - p. 93, L. 18.) Mr. Collie denies making this statement. (R. Conf. p. 102, Collie
Depo., p. 134, L. 7 - p. 136, L. 19.)
Although Mr. Zickau acknowledges that Mr. Collie told him, before the February 26,
2009 amended SBPOs, that ENA and Syringa had a Teaming Agreement, he also claims that Mr.
Collie told him that the Teaming Agreement was not an impediment to amending the SBPOs,
and that ENA would do whatever the state asked ENA to do. (R. p. 2399, Zickau Depo., p. 102,
L. 6 - p. 105, L. 25.) Mr. Zickau also testified that neither Mr. Collie nor anyone else from ENA

complained, objected or protested the amended SBPOs. (R. p. 2399, Zickau Depo., p. 103, L. 20
- p. 105, L. 25.)
Mr. Collie did, however, report conditions in Idaho to the ENA CFO Rex Miller on
February 11. Mr. Miller shared Mr. Collie's report by email to ENA CEO David Pierce (a
business record of ENA) in which he noted, among other things, "He (Collie) finally received
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Qwest's numbers," that "they issued a rules of engagement document that strongly favored
Qwest and that the state is leaning toward issuing an update to that document that says we must
use Qwest to provide all the IEN circuits", and that "Mike Gwartney and Greg Zickau - are
apparently under some kind of need to give Qwest this deal or appease them at a minimum." 5
(R. Conf. p. 166, Miller email; R Conf. pp. 474 - 476, Collie Depo., p. 306, L. 7 - p. 317, L. 7;
R. Conf. pp. 480 - 482, Miller Depo., p. 34, L. 14 - p. 45, L. 5.)
ENA told Syringa nothing about the amended SBPOs at the time they were issued.
(R. pp. 2402-2403, Lowe Depo., p. 163, L. 4 - p. 166, L. 10.) In fact ENA employee Bob Collie
communicated with Syringa CEO Greg Lowe, by email on July 11, 2009 as if the amended
SBPOs had not been issued and ENA "continued to stand behind" the Teaming Agreement.
ENA has asked multiple times to have the ability to quote circuits
from multiple providers and have been told no each time. We have
also shared our teaming agreement with the state and have discussed
it in detail with OCIO and Admin leadership so there is no possibility
that they are confused about where we stand on the matter.
Furthermore, we have stated numerous times that the current
environment is not our preferred, normal or typical manner of doing
business nor is it the way that we bid in response to the State's RFP.
We continue to stand behind our teaming agreement, however at this
point we have no ability to implement its functions as we do not have
the ability to award a backbone or circuits outside of the State's
direction.
(R. Conf. pp. 142-146.)

5

The district court erroneously struck the February 11, 2009 Miller email. The email is an
admission by ENA and is not hearsay, as against ENA, under LR.E. 80l(d)(2). Further, it was
evidence of the state of mind of Bob Collie.
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Mr. Gwartney and Purchasing Administrator William Bums admitted the amended JEN
SBPOs do not provide for the provision of same or similar services. (R. Conf. p. 429, Bums
Depo., p. 70, L. 13 - p. 72, L. 23.)

16.

Idaho Has Made No Other Multiple SBPOs Requiring the
Contractors To Act as Equal Partners

As noted above, Idaho Code §67-57 l 8A allows an award of contracts to two (2) or more
bidders to provide the same or similar services or property when specified conditions are
satisfied. The State of Idaho had several multiple SBPOs not involving the JEN in operation in
2009. Each of these multiple SBPOs was for the same or similar services or property. 6 The
multiple SBPOs in existence before the IEN SBPOs were issued generally concerned fungible
things and services like Bulk Fuel, Medical Supplies, Office Furniture, Court Reporting, Copiers,
Propane, Tires and Vehicles. (R. pp. 623-624, Heneise Affidavit, Exh. 1.) No multiple SBPOs
in existence before February 26, 2009 required the vendors to act as "equal partners." (R.
Conf. p. 294.) The Idaho Purchasing Guide provided at the time, consistent with these examples,
that multiple awards "shall not be made for the purpose of dividing the business."

(R.

pp. 1707-1709.)

17.

Syringa is Told: You' II Regret the Day

On July 15, 2009, during a dinner attended by Mr. Lowe and Mr. Gwartney, Mr.
Gwartney stated that he and Governor Butch Otter would be immune to any ramifications
associated with the IEN procurement, and that, instead, Syringa would be punished. Mr.
6

"Property" as defined by LC. § 67-5716(3) includes both goods and services among other
things; see also IDAPA 38.05.01.29 ("Property").
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Gwartney also stated that he would hate to see the rest of Syringa's existing state business go
away and that Syringa will "regret the day [Syringa] tangled with Butch Otter and Mike
Gwartney." (R. pp. 1167-1173, at 1171, Amended Third Aff. of Lowe if 16.)

II.
1)

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court err in holding, as a matter of law, that Syringa was barred,

by failure to exhaust administrative remedies set out in Idaho Code § 67-5377(1)(c), from
challenging the legality of post-award amendments to Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders issued
to prime contractors ENA and Qwest that violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A because:

2)

a.

Syringa was not a "vendor whose bid is considered"?

b.

The Idaho Code provides no post-contract administrative remedy?

Did the district court err in holding, as a matter of law, that ENA is not liable for

breaching the Teaming Agreement because:
a.

The Teaming Agreement is a contract and not "merely an agreement to

b.

The Teaming Agreement was not terminated by its terms?

c.

ENA' s acceptance of the amended ENA SBPO is evidence that ENA

agree"?

agreed to the assignment of Syringa's work under the Teaming Agreement
to Qwest?
3)

Did the district court err by concluding that Syringa failed to overcome the

presumption that Mr. Gwartney acted within the course and scope of his employment, without
malice and without criminal intent?
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4)

Did the district court err by concluding that Syringa failed to overcome the

presumption that Mr. Zickau acted within the course and scope of his employment, without
malice and without criminal intent?
5)

Did the district court err by dismissing Syringa's claims for tortious interference

against Qwest on the basis that the Teaming Agreement is not enforceable and that Qwest's
conduct was not wrongful?
6)

Did the district court err by awarding attorneys' fees to Qwest under Idaho Code

§ 12-120(3)?
7)

Is Syringa entitled to attorneys' fees

and costs against ENA on appeal under

Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41?
III.

A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review

This Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de nova. Curlee v.

Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008). Fenn v. Noah,
142 Idaho 775, 778, 133 P. 3d 1240, 1243 (2006). A grant of summary judgment is warranted
only where "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c). Circumstantial evidence can create a
material issue of fact, particularly in the context of cases involving tortious interference. See

Highland Enterprises., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 986 P.2d 996 (1999) (noting proof of
intent usually comes from circumstantial evidence and inference). "[A]ll reasonable inferences
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that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the norunoving party, and disputed
facts will be liberally construed in favor of the norunoving party." Hopkins Nw. Fund, LLC v.

Land'icapes Unlimited, LLC, No. 37170, 2011 WL 5142054 (Idaho Nov. I, 2011) (quoting
Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008)). When
questions of law are presented on a motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court exercises
free review. Fuller v. Dave Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 850, 252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011).
Syringa asserted, among other things, that the record, including excerpts of audio-visual
depositions taken pursuant to I.R.C.P. 30(b)(4), demonstrates material issues of fact and raises
issues of witness credibility that preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., Athay v. Stacey, 142
Idaho 360, 128 P.3d 897 (2005). The district court expressly rejected Syringa's request that it
review audio-visual deposition excerpts, stating: "It is settled that it is for the trier of fact to
weigh the credibility of witnesses and it is error for a district court to do so in summary judgment
proceedings." (R. p. 2570.)
It is clear that the district court misapprehended the factual and witness credibility issues
raised by Syringa. Syringa does not contend that the credibility of witnesses should be resolved
in summary judgment proceedings. The record must, however, be assessed to determine if it
raises any issues of credibility concerning a material fact. Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469,
471, 700 P.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1985) C'lf the credibility of an affiant furnishing direct evidence
is put at issue by other, circumstantial evidence, the credibility issue should not be resolved on
summary judgment."); see also Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285
(Ct. App. 1984) (finding summary judgment improper where affidavit conflicted with deed in
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evidence). There is a significant distinction between determining whether witnesses are credible
and determining whether the credibility of a witness creates a genuine issue of material fact.
I.R.C.P. 30(b)(4)(B) and (D) state that an audio-visual recording of a deposition is an
official record that may be used for any purpose. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide no
basis upon which the court can choose to ignore any part of the official record offered by a nonmoving party in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, the district court
erroneously refused to consider the audio-visual portions of the official record submitted by
Syringa on the basis that it was being asked to resolve issues of credibility. In fact, the contrary
is true. The court's decision to ignore Syringa's proffered audio-visual evidence and to accept
written affidavits and deposition transcripts at face value was, itself, a determination of
credibility that was clear error.
Syringa acknowledges that issues of credibility do not necessarily attach to the testimony
of every witness. The credibility of Mr. Gwartney, Mr. Zickau, Ms. Luna, Mr. Little, Ms. Hill
and Mr. Collie is, however, raised by the record, including particularly the testimony of former
Deputy Attorney General Melissa Vandenberg. DVD's with excerpts of the testimony of Ms.
Vandenberg and of each of the witnesses identified above are contained in the Exhibits to the
Clerk's Record, Roden Exhibits 2-3 (see R. Conf. pp. 488 - 513).
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B.

The District Court Erred By Not Allowing Syringa to Challenge Post-Award
Amendments to the SBPOs that Violated State Law
1.

Litigation Offered the Only Remedy Available to Syringa for Its
Claims Based on the Violation of Idaho Code § 67-5718A

Counts Two and Three of Syringa's complaint sought declaratory judgment that the
amended SBPOs splitting the IEN project into separate contracts for dissimilar services violated
Idaho Code § 67-5718A. The district court rejected these claims on the basis that Syringa had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided by Idaho Code § 67-5733. The district court
decision was erroneous for two reasons.

First, Syringa was not a "vendor whose bid is

considered" under Idaho Code § 67-5733. Second, Idaho Code § 67-5733 provides no postcontract administrative remedy. The only remedy available to Syringa, as a subcontractor to the
holder of a state SBPO harmed by post-contract conduct, was to sue and seek a declaratory
ruling that the amended SBPOs violated the law.
2.

Syringa Had No Obligation to Appeal Under Idaho Code § 67-5733
Because it Was Not "A Vendor Whose Bid is Considered"

Administrative remedies originate solely by statute.

Regan v. Kootenai County, 140

Idaho 721, 724, 100 P.3d 615, 618 (2004) (emphasis added). The administrative appeal process
for state purchasing is governed by Idaho Code § 67-5733.

Syringa acknowledges that the

administrative appeal requirements of Idaho Code § 67-5733 apply to bid specification
challenges and to award challenges.

Idaho Code § 67-5733 does not, however, apply to

subcontractors who did not submit a bid.
The Idaho statutes concerning state procurement define specific terms (capitalized
hereinafter) that are used in the procurement process. These defined terms make it clear that the

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 32

administrative remedy provisions of Idaho Code § 67-5733 that apply to bidding and awards do
not apply to Contracts and Purchase Orders.
The terms Bid, Bidder, Contractor, Lowest Responsible Bidder and Vendor that apply to
the analysis whether an administrative appeal was available under Idaho Code § 67-5733 are
contained in Idaho Code § 67-5716 and defined, in relevant part, as follows:
(10) Vendor.
property to the state.

A person or entity capable of supplying

(11) Bidder. A vendor who has submitted a bid on a specific
item or items of property to be acquired by the state.
(12) Lowest responsible bidder. The responsible bidder
whose bid reflects the lowest acquisition price to be paid by the state;
(13)
acquisition

Contractor.

A bidder who has been awarded an
contract.

***
(15) Bid. A written offer to perform a contract to purchase or
supply property or services in response to an invitation for bid or
request for proposal.

See also IDAPA 38.05.01.011. Application of these definitions makes the description of the
state procurement process a straightforward matter:
1.
A Vendor submits a Bid on a specific item or items of
property to be acquired by the state. The Vendor that submits a Bid
also becomes, by definition, a Bidder.
2.
A determination is made concerning which Bidder is
the Lowest Responsible Bidder.
3.
When the award is made, the Bidder that is awarded
the acquisition contract becomes a Contractor.
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The district court ruled that Syringa was barred from challenging the amended SBPOs
because it failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to it under Idaho Code § 675733(1)(c). That statute afforded no such remedy to Syringa because it applies solely to bidders
and the determination of the lowest responsible bidder:
A vendor whose bid is considered may, within five (5) working days
following receipt of notice that he is not the lowest responsible
bidder, apply to the director of the department of administration for
appointment of a determinations officer. The application shall set
forth in specific terms the reasons why the administrator's decision is
thought to be erroneous.
LC. § 67-573 3(l)(c) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 67-5733(1 )(c) does not apply to Contracts,
Contractors, or Syringa in this case. It does not apply to Syringa because Syringa was not "a
vendor whose bid is considered." Mr. Gwartney made this same point in his July 24, 2009 letter
to Syringa in which he stated:
". . . it is Administration's position that only ENA, Qwest, and
Verizon (the three responsive proposers) had statutory rights to
protest the awards."
(Rpp. 739-742, at 739-740, Gwartney Aff., Exh. A, emphasis added.)
The district court erred by imposing the administrative appeal requirement of Idaho Code

§ 67-5733(l)(c) on subcontractor Syringa, which did not submit a bid. The dismissal of Counts
Two and Three of Syringa's complaint should, therefore, be reversed.

3.

The District Court Erred by Ruling That Syringa Failed to Exhaust a
Non-Existent Post-Contract Administrative Remedy

No one challenged or appealed the award after the January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent was
sent. The IEN SBPO contracts were issued to ENA and to Qwest six days later on January 26,
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2009 as described in Section 3.10 of the RFP. (Little Exhibits, Exh. A, pp. 26-27.) The district
court ruled that failure to appeal the January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent and/or the SBPOs and
amended SBPOs precludes Syringa from challenging the amended SBPOs in this case. This
ruling was erroneous because Idaho Code § 67-5733 provides no administrative remedy for the
issuance of SBPOs and/or amended SBPOs.
Idaho Code § 67-5733(1)(c) does not address and had no application to the IEN
procurement after the award to ENA and Qwest became final and SBPOs were issued. Once the
selection of the successful Bidder or Bidders has been completed, an award becomes final and
the state is authorized to enter into a Contract. When that happens, the Purchase is documented
by a Contract or Purchase Order and the successful Bidder becomes a Contractor. The Contract
in this case took the form of a SBPO. Neither ENA nor Syringa, as its subcontractor, had any
duty to prosecute an administrative appeal when the amended SBPOs were issued because
SBPOs are Contracts on which the parties must agree and to which Idaho Code § 67-5733(1)(c)
does not apply.
Confronted with the January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent, the January 28, 2009 SBPOs, the
February 26, 2009 amended SBPOs and Syringa's analysis that Idaho Code § 67-5733 does not
apply to post-award contracts or amended contracts, the district court concluded, without citation
to authority that:
... These amendments were effectively the awards. Syringa did not
exhaust its administrative remedies in challenging these awards and
cannot now resort to the court to challenge the awards.
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(R. p. 1659.) In so doing, the district court erroneously required Syringa to exhaust a post-

contract administrative remedy where none exists. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State of Idaho, 147
Idaho 232, 239-240, 207 P.3d 963, 970-971 (2009) ("Failure to exhaust administrative remedies
is not a bar to litigation when there are no remedies to exhaust.").
As noted above, the remedy provided by Idaho Code § 67-5733 applies solely to "a
vendor whose bid has been considered" and is limited to whether a proper determination has
been made concerning "lowest responsible bidder." Nothing in the statute provides that appeal
can be taken from the amendment of a state Contract or SBPO, or that the time to prosecute such
an appeal is triggered once by the notice of award, a second time by the issuance of the
acquisition Contract and again every time the Contract is amended. The language of Idaho Code
§ 67-5733 is plain, obvious and unambiguous. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Medical

Ctr., No. 37574-2010, 2011 WL 5375192, at *5 (Idaho Nov. 9, 2011). The district court's
erroneous dismissal of Counts Two and Three of Syringa's complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should be reversed because LC. § 67-5733 does not apply to post award
Contracts or Contract amendments.
C.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Syringa's Contract Claim Against
ENA
1.

The District Court Erred in Determining that the Teaming
Agreement was Not Enforceable

The district court concluded that the Teaming Agreement was not an enforceable contract
because it was incomplete.

(R. pp. 2590-2591, Memo. Dec. Re: Motions for Summary

Judgment.) The district court erred because the question whether the Teaming Agreement was a
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binding contract presents disputed issues of material fact that can only be resolved by the jury.
"When the existence of a contract is at issue, and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more
than one inference, it is for the jury to determine whether a contract in fact exists." Johnson v.

Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 368, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984); Mackey v. Four Rivers
Packing Company, 145 Idaho 408, 179 P.3d 1064 (2008); Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143
Idaho 733, 738, 152 P.3d 604, 609 (2007) ("Whether the parties intended to form a contract is a
question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact."); see also, Dante v. Goles, 121 Idaho 149,
151, 823 P.2d 183, 185 (Ct. App. 1990).
The district court failed to draw factual inferences in favor of Syringa as the non-moving
party and failed to take note of evidence outside the four comers of the written Teaming
Agreement. The evidence the district court ignored includes the RFP provisions that made it
clear that a multiple award could be made, that ENA and Syringa knew and discussed the
possibility of a multiple award before the Teaming Agreement was executed on January 7, 2009
(R. Conf. pp. 308-309, Landow email), that Syringa provided prices to ENA for its services
(R. pp. 1794-1795, Lowe Depa., p. 94, L. 7

p. 95, L. 22; 1797-1801, Lowe Depa., p. 174, L. 21

p. 178, L. 7; R. Conf. pp. 514-582), that ENA accepted Syringa's prices, and that the testimony
of Syringa's CEO created an issue of fact concerning the compulsory requirement that the parties
enter into a service agreement that would include "flow down" provisions that might be
"required" as a result of the Prime Contract with the state. (R. pp. 1798-1801, Lowe Depa., p.
175, L. 3 - p. 178, L. 7.)
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An enforceable agreement must be sufficiently complete in its material terms to enable
the trier of fact to determine (1) what acts are to be performed and (2) when performance is
complete.

Dale's Service Co. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 534 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975).

Agreements that do not meet this standard because they leave material terms for future resolution
are often given the label an "agreement-to-agree." This nicely alliterative label, though
convenient, can easily mislead. The inquiry is not whether a disputed contract is "an agreement
to agree," but instead whether it is sufficiently complete.

Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348,

As this Court stated in Giacobbi

670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983), a "contract must be

complete, definite and certain in all its material terms or contain provisions which are capable of
themselves of being reduced to certainty."

Whether the Teaming Agreement is a complete

agreement is a disputed question of material fact.
The Idaho appellate courts have not yet had the occasion to address the effect of the
foregoing contract principles on a public contract teaming agreement. A review of cases from
other jurisdictions, however, reflects that teaming agreements are common and subject to the
same contract principles as other contracts. The Third Circuit, for example, note in ATACS Corp.

v. Trans World Commc 'ns, Inc., 155 F.3d 659 (3d Cir. 1998), that the anticipation of a future
agreement does not render a teaming agreement incomplete:
As with most other "preliminary agreements" precedent to an
executed contract ... , the question arises whether the teaming
agreement itself, absent an executed subcontract, may constitute the
basis for contractual liability. Courts have generally allowed such a
cause of action in contract based solely on the teaming agreement, but
not without overcoming two major obstacles: (1) the intent of the
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parties to enter into a binding contractual relationship; and (2) the
existence of sufficiently objective criteria to enforce.
155 F. 3d. at 666 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). The ultimate question as noted by ATACS
is whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which the finder of fact can determine
the existence of mutual intent to enter a contract and the existence of objective criteria to
enforce. See also EG&G, Inc. v. The Cube Corp., No. 178996, 2002 WL 31950215 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Dec 23, 2002). The district court erred by making that determination on the disputed facts in this
record.
2.

The Teaming Agreement Reflects the Parties' Intent to be Bound and
Contains Sufficiently Objective Criteria to Enforce

The evidence of the agreed upon obligations of Syringa and ENA begins with the express
terms of the Teaming Agreement.

Those express terms define the parties' obligations in

connection with the "Proposal," the "Project" and the "Prime Contract" in paragraph 2.2(a). By
those terms, the Teaming Agreement defines (1) the obligations of Syringa and ENA with
respect to their efforts to obtain the Prime Contract and (2) their respective areas of responsibility
should their efforts result in the award of a Prime Contract to ENA.
The Teaming Agreement is unquestionably complete concerning the parties' efforts to
obtain the Prime Contract. The Teaming Agreement provides that ENA will assume the lead
role in preparing the proposal and that Syringa will provide "such input, review and information
into the Proposal as is required to complete all requirements for the Request for Proposal." (R. p.
576, § 2(c).) The Teaming Agreement provides that ENA will assume the lead role for external
communication regarding the Project and Proposal and that Syringa will notify ENA if it was
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contacted by the DOA or its agents. (R. p. 576, § 2(d).) The Teaming Agreement provides that
neither ENA nor Syringa will "participate in efforts related to submitting a Proposal without the
other party's prior written consent." (R. p. 576, § 2(e).) It also provides that neither party shall
enter into a new contract or future arrangement with any customer that may be eligible to receive
service under the Project without the written approval of the other party and that neither party
will use confidential information of the other for any purpose other than in furtherance of ENA' s
efforts to win the Prime Contract. (R. p. 577, § 2(f).)
The Teaming Agreement also contains material terms (or provisions that are capable of
being reduced to certainty) relative to the obligations of the parties in the event the Prime
Contract is awarded to ENA. The Teaming Agreement provides that ENA will be the prime
contractor and that Syringa will provide the "connectivity services." (R. p. 576, § 2(a).) Utilizing
imperative language reflective of their intent to be bound, ENA and Syringa state that they
"shall" enter into a service agreement should ENA win a Prime Contract. They also described
the mutual terms of the service agreement.
The service agreement terms include ENA's specific areas of responsibility (R. p. 577,
§ 3(b)), Syringa's specific areas of responsibility (R. pp. 577-578, § 3(c)), and agreed upon areas

of joint responsibility (R. p. 578, § 3(d)).

The Teaming Agreement also provides for

incorporating state contract terms by requiring the service agreement to contain "any required
flow-down provisions or other appropriate terms similar to those set forth in the Prime Contract."
(R. p. 577, § 3(a); see also Special Instructions, Little Exhibits, Exh. B, pp. 1-2.)
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The district court concluded that the Teaming Agreement was not complete because it did
not specify the price Syringa would receive for the connectivity services it agreed to provide.
(R. pp. 2590-2591.) In making this determination, the district court focused solely on the terms

of the written Teaming Agreement and ignored the fact that Syringa provided a fixed price bid to
ENA under section 2(c) of the Teaming Agreement on January 8 and 9, 2009. (R. 1794-1795,
Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7 - p. 95, L. 22; R. pp. 1797-1798, Lowe Depo., p. 174, L. 15 - p. 176, L.
5; R. Conf. pp. 514-582.) ENA accepted that pricing by submitting the ENA Cost Proposal. (R.
pp. 1502-1534.)
The district court noted that the Teaming Agreement required the parties to enter a
service agreement if the State awarded a Prime Contract to ENA, but appeared to conclude that
the provisions concerning the service agreement made the Teaming Agreement an "agreement to
agree." The requirement that the parties execute a related agreement in the future does not,
however, require a conclusion that the Teaming Agreement was incomplete.

It presents a

question of fact whether the parties intended to be bound upon the occurrence of the objectively
ascertainable event of ENA receiving a prime contract (the original SBPO) and whether the
terms for the service agreement that are described in the Teaming Agreement are sufficiently
definite to permit enforcement.

See ATACS Corp., 155 F.3d at 666.

As noted above,

Sections 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d) and (e) of the Teaming Agreement identify the terms of the service
agreement with sufficient detail to reflect the intent of the parties to be bound and to identify the
required performance.
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By defining the parties' individual and joint obligations should ENA be awarded a Prime
Contract, and identifying a method for determining the terms not detailed therein like the "flow
down" provisions (see Little Exhibits, Exh. A, p. 30, RFP § 5.0), the written Teaming Agreement
contains the material, detailed terms from which a jury could determine (1) the acts to be
performed and (2) when performance was complete. See Dale's Service, 96 Idaho at 664, 514
P .2d at 1104. To the extent additional evidence of the agreement and intent of the parties was
necessary, it exists in the January 8 and 9, 2009 pricing submissions provided to ENA as
discussed more fully in section C.4 of the Statement of Facts, supra.
The district court's decision that the Teaming Agreement was too incomplete to be
enforceable was erroneous and should be reversed.
3.

The District Court Erred in Finding that the State Formally and
Finally Rejected the JEN Alliance Proposal

Paragraph 2(h) of the Teaming Agreement provides that the Teaming Agreement will
terminate without liability if "the customer formally and finally rejects the Proposal or cancels
the Project." (R. p. 577, § 2(h)(i).) The district court concluded as a secondary ground for
dismissal that "the IEN Alliance sought the entire award of the IEN work ... (and) ... [t]hat
both the decision to make a multiple award to Qwest and ENA and the final division of work as
reflected in the amendments to the SBPOs constituted a formal and final rejection of the IEN
Alliance Proposal." (R. pp. 2595-2596.) This conclusion is erroneous for several reasons.
First, the district court based its conclusion that the amended SBPOs constituted a formal
and final rejection of the ENA proposal on the mistaken premise that DOA had the power to
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unilaterally impose the amended SBPOs without the consent of ENA and Qwest. (R. pp. 1659,
2595.) The amended SBPOs are not unilaterally imposed modifications of the IEN award. They
are contract amendments that required agreement by the parties. (See, e.g., testimony of Deputy
Attorney General Melissa Vandenberg that SBPOs are contracts which can be amended only by
agreement of the parties (R. p. 2470, Vandenberg Depa., p. 84, L. 4-p. 85, L. 15).) The district
court erred by concluding that the amended SBPOs did not require the agreement of ENA.
Second, nothing in the Teaming Agreement indicates that ENA and Syringa intended the
Teaming Agreement to end if ENA received a contract for part, but not all, of the IEN "Project".
(R. pp. 576-578.) The Teaming Agreement defines the "Project" with specific reference to the
RFP. (R. p. 576 § l(c).) The RFP repeatedly states that the Prime Contract could be awarded to
up to four providers (see, e.g., Little Exhibits, Exh. A, p. 31; Exh. E, pp. 5-6, 10, 15-16,
RFP § 5.3, Amended§ 5.3, "A-1" and "A-15"). The RFP also required pricing be bid on a per
unit basis (which ENA and Syringa provided) so a multiple award could be accommodated.
(Little Exhibits, Exh. A, p. 47, RFP § 10.0.) These RFP provisions led ENA and Syringa to
conclude, and to discuss the possibility that a multiple award could be made before the Teaming
Agreement was executed on January 7, 2009. (R. Conf. pp. 308-309.) Based on this possibility,
Section 2(a) explicitly acknowledges that ENA might receive less than the entire Project by
stating, "ENA is seeking to become either (i) the prime contractor for the Project or (ii) the prime
contractor for the portion of the Project which provides all services to schools and libraries". If it
is not clear as a matter of law from the plain language of the Teaming Agreement that the phrase
"formally and finally rejects" means rejection of all parts of the ENA Proposal and Cost
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Proposal, then a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning what the parties intended by
their language that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. The district court committed error
by doing so.
Third, even if one accepts the erroneous conclusion that the ENA Proposal was an offer
to provide all or none of the IEN work (which Syringa contests) and that DOA's decision to
make a multiple award was a rejection of that offer, the rejection was not "formal and final." It
was, if anything, a rejection by operation of law. See Heritage Excavation, Inc. v. Brisco, 141
Idaho 40, 43, 105 P.3d 700, 703 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Phelps v. Good, 15 Idaho 76, 84, 96 P.
216, 218 (1908)).

The words "formal and final" do not, in common language, mean an

occurrence that happens by operation of law. Whether the multiple award was a "formal and
final" rejection of the "Proposal" as intended by the parties under the Teaming Agreement
presents a disputed question of fact that must be resolved by the jury.

See Henderson v.

Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.C., 148 Idaho 638, 640, 227 P.3d 568, 570 (2010); Triad Leasing
& Financial, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., 148 Idaho 503, 513, 212 P.3d 1092, 1102

(2008).
4.

The District Court Erred in Holding ENA did not Breach the
Teaming Agreement

The district court held that Syringa had not established that ENA breached the Teaming
Agreement "because there is no evidence that ENA was responsible for the manner in which
DOA awarded the work". (R. pp. 2595-2596, Memo. Dec. Re: Motions for Summary Judgment.)
This holding is legally and factually wrong.
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The district court is \\.Tong on the law because, as noted above and in the testimony of
Melissa Vandenberg, the DOA had no power to unilaterally amend the SBPOs. (R. p. 2470,
Vandenberg Depo., p. 84, L. 4 - p. 85, L. 15.)
The district court is wrong on the facts because the record reflects that ENA breached the
Teaming Agreement by accepting the amended SBPOs. ENA employee Bob Collie even told
Mr. Zickau that the Teaming Agreement was "not something the State needed to worry about"
and that "ENA would do whatever the State asked them to do". (R. p. 2399, Zickau Depo.,
p. 102, L. 1-p.105, L. 25.) ENA also discussed becoming a subcontractor to Qwest in breach
of paragraph 2(d) of the Teaming Agreement (R. Conf. p. 156) and the record contains evidence
that ENA tried to negotiate changes in the amended SBPOs with DOA. (R. Conf. pp. 288-292,
Collie email, 2/19/09; R. p. 2399, supra.)
Moreover, there is evidence in the record that ENA breached Paragraph 2(e) of the
Teaming Agreement before the amended SBPOs were issued.

The Teaming Agreement

provided that neither party shall participate in efforts related to submitting a Proposal
independent of the other, excepting only the right to submit proposals unrelated to the Project.
(R. p. 576, § 2(e).) ENA breached this provision of the Teaming Agreement starting February 10

when it met with Qwest employee Clint Berry to determine the combined price ENA and Qwest
would charge for the same connectivity services that ENA had already agreed to obtain from
Syringa. (R. Conf. p. 166, Miller email; R. Conf. p. 156, Berry email.)
Finally, ENA had the right and ability to say "no" to the amended SBPO offered to it by
DOA. When ENA learned, after the issuance of the first SBPO, that the DOA was intending to
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replace Syringa with Qwest as ENA's connectivity provider, ENA could and should have
asserted that DOA could not do so under Idaho Code§ 67-571 SA. ENA was under no obligation
to accept a contract amendment to provide content services if ENA was not also contracted to
provide connectivity services.

ENA breached the Teaming Agreement by accepting the

amended SBPOs.
The decision of the district court granting summary judgment against Syringa's claims
against ENA for breach of contract was erroneous and should be reversed.
D.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Defendants
Gwartney and Zickau on the Interference With Contract Claim

Syringa's interference with contract claim alleged that Defendants Gwartney and Zickau
knew of the Teaming Agreement between ENA and Syringa and intentionally interfered with
that contractual relationship, causing Syringa injury. The state moved for summary judgment
alleging that Syringa could not "put forth evidence that they [State Defendants] acted outside the
course and scope of employment, with malice or with criminal intent." The district court granted
the state's motion, finding that Syringa "failed to come forward with admissible evidence to
overcome the presumption that Gwartney and/or Zickau acted within the course and scope of
employment, without malice and without criminal intent." (R. p. 2584.) 7 In so stating, the
district court misstated the applicable standard, failed to address the threshold legal issue whether

7

The elements of the tort of interference with contract are identified in section E. l ., infra.
Because the district court based its ruling on immunity, only the immunity issue is discussed
here.
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the SBPOs violated Idaho Code § 67-5718A and failed to recognize that genuine issues of
material fact exist that preclude summary judgment.
1.

State Employees Are Not Immune from Suit for Interference with
Contract Where (1) They Intentionally Commit a Wrongful or
Unlawful Act Without Legal Justification or (2) Intentionally Commit
a Wrongful or Unlawful Act with Ill Will

Section 6-904 of the Idaho Tort Claims Act provides in part that governmental
employees, (1) while acting within the course and scope of their employment and (2) without
malice or criminal intent, shall not be liable for any claim which "arises out of ... interference
with contract rights." A plaintiff who sues a state employee must show that a state employee
was: (1) acting outside the course and scope of his or her employment, (2) acting with malice or
(3) acting with criminal intent. In addition, Idaho Code Section 6-903(c) provides a rebuttable
presumption that any act or omission of an employee "within the time and place of his
employment is within the course and scope of his employment and without malice or criminal
intent."
The district court incorrectly joined subsections (1 ), (2) and (3) by concluding that
Syringa had "failed to come forward with admissible evidence to overcome the presumption that
Gwartney and/or Zickau acted within the course and scope of their employment, without malice
and without criminal intent." (Emphasis added.) By stating the test in the conjunctive, the Court
misstated and misapplied the law. If a plaintiff establishes any one of the three parts of the test,
the employee loses his or her immunity.
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2.

The Violation of Idaho Code § 67-5718A is Evidence that the Conduct
of Gwartney and Zickau Was Wrongful, Unlawful and Motivated by
Ill Will

The district court concluded that Syringa had not established Mr. Gwartney or
Mr. Zickau influenced the preparation of the IEN RFP, influenced the technical review or
influenced the evaluation of the proposal. (R. p. 2585, Memo. Dec. Re: Motions for Summary
Judgment.) These conclusions miss the point. Syringa's inference claim against Mr. Gwartney
and Mr. Zickau is based on the fact that they caused the state to issue amended SBPOs to Qwest
and ENA that violated Idaho Code § 67-5718A and interfered with Syringa's interest under the
Teaming Agreement.
The district court refused to consider the violation ofldaho Code§ 67-5718A as evidence
of wrongful conduct because it concluded that Syringa's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies precluded it from asserting violation of the statute as a basis for its interference claims.
The district court erred because, as demonstrated above, there were no administrative remedies
for Syringa to exhaust. Further, even if Syringa were precluded from declaratory relief by the
jurisdictional requirements of the exhaustion doctrine, that failure does not make the conduct of
the parties who caused violation of the statute any less wrongful or extinguish the violation.

Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106 P.2d 455 (2005). Whether the
amended SBPOs violate Idaho Code § 67-5718A is a material, disputed issue in this case.
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a.

Idaho Uses a Competitive Bid Process Which Requires It to
Acquire Goods and Services from the Lowest Responsible
Bidder Except in Limited Circumstances

Idaho has a strong interest in the use of a competitive bid process. See Idaho Code § 675715.

The Legislature reiterated its interest in the competitive bid process by including a

specific proviso, consistent with federal E-Rate requirements, that IEN telecommunications
services and equipment be acquired through "an open and competitive bidding process" in the
enabling legislation for the IEN. See I.C. § 57-5745D.
The competitive bidding process usually results in the acquisition of property by the state
from the lowest responsible bidder. There is, however, a single exception that allows the state, in
specific circumstances, to obtain property from multiple bidders. The exception is contained in
Idaho Code§ 67-5718A.

b.

The Multiple Bidder Award Exception to the Lowest
Responsible Bidder Requirement Exists Only for Property
That Is "the Same or Similar"

The single exception to the requirement that Idaho agencies acquire significant goods and
services from the lowest responsible bidder using a competitive bid process concerns property
that is "the same or similar." The statute describes the property and circumstances to which it
may be applied, in pertinent part, as follows:

67-5718A.
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BY
CONTRACT -- A WARD TO MORE THAN ONE BIDDER -ST AND ARDS FOR MULTIPLE A WARDS -- APPROVAL BY
ADMINISTRATOR.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter to the contrary,
the administrator of the division of purchasing may make an award of
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a contract to two (2) or more bidders to furnish the same or similar
property where more than one ( 1) contractor is necessary:
(a) To furnish the types of property and quantities required by
state agencies;
(b) To provide expeditious and cost-efficient acquisition of
property for state agencies; or
(c) To enable state agencies to acquire property which is
compatible with property previously acquired.
LC. § 67-5718A(l) (emphasis added). This statute allows the state to award contracts to more
than one bidder, under specified conditions, to acquire the same or similar property. Where, on
the other hand, the state intends to acquire property that is not "the same or similar" it is clear,
from the plain language of the statute, that a multiple bidder award is not allowed. See Verska,
2011 WL 53 7 5192, at *5 ("This Court has consistently adhered to the primary canon of statutory
construction that where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of
the legislature must be given effect ... ") (quoting Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai Cnty., 98
Idaho 925, 928, 576 P.2d 206, 209 (1978)).
In addition to limiting multiple bidder awards to circumstances involving acquisition of
the "same or similar property," Idaho Code § 67-5718A(2) conditions multiple bidder awards
upon the administrator of the Division of Purchasing first making a written determination that a
proposed contract to multiple bidders meets the criteria set forth in§ 67-5718A(l)(a), (b) or (c).
The language of LC. §67-5718A(2), "no award of a contract to multiple bidders shall be made ..
. unless the administrator ... makes a written determination ... ," makes it clear that the written
determination by the administrator of the Division of Purchasing is required to be made before
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the award is made. The failure by Mr. Gwartney and Mr. Zickau to seek the required written
determination by the Administrator of the Division of Purchasing is evidence of wrongful
conduct and intent to violate the requirements of Idaho Code § 67-5718A the district court
ignored.

c.

The Amended JEN SBPOs Are Not Lawful Multiple Awards under
Idaho Code§ 67-5718A Because They Are Not for the Acquisition of
Same or Similar Property

The IEN RFP sought proposals for a comprehensive, end-to-end solution to create the
Idaho Education Network.

(Little Exhibits, Exh. A, pp. 19-22, §§ 3.1, 3.2.) The ENA and

Qwest proposals each offered a comprehensive solution.

A multiple award was issued and

virtually identical SBPOs (SBP01308 to Qwest and SBP01309 to ENA) were issued by which
ENA and Qwest were to provide the full spectrum of services requested by the IEN RFP. (R. pp.
582-585; R. Conf. pp. 96-97, Burns Depo., p. 64, L. 24 - p. 69, L. 6.)
Less than a month later the DOA, directed by Mr. Gwartney and Mr. Zickau, issued
amended SBPOs that require Qwest and ENA to be "equal partners" and that divide the IEN
Project into two separate contracts for services and property that are neither the same nor similar
in violation of Idaho Code § 67-5718A. (R. pp. 586-593; R. pp. 566-574, 570, Lowe Aff.

~

24;

R. Conf. pp. 97-98, Burns Depo., p. 69, L. 21 - p. 73, L. 1.) The amended SBPOs also violate
Idaho Code § 67-5718A(2) because the Administrator failed to make the required written
determination before they were issued. (R. Conf. p. 322, Vandenberg 7/31/09 Memo.; see also
R. Conf. p. 286, Burns 2/22/10 Memo.)
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d.

Whether the Conduct of Gwartney and Zickau was Wrongful,
Unlawful and Motivated by Ill Will is a Genuine Issue of Material
Fact

The district court concluded that Syringa did not present any evidence that Mr. Gwartney
had any role or influence on Mr. Zickau's recommendation that DOA make a multiple award to
Qwest and ENA or any influence over the manner in which DOA ultimately divided the work
between ENA and Qwest.

(R. pp. 2584-2585, Memo. Dec. Re: Motions for Summary

Judgment.) The district court erred in making this finding because the record contains evidence
from which a jury could reasonably infer that the multiple award was a pretext to allow direction
of the IEN work to Qwest, that Mr. Gwartney was involved and that he acted wrongfully and
with malice toward Syringa. The record also contains evidence that Mr. Zickau acted in concert
with Mr. Gwartney.
Mr. Gwartney told Syringa CEO Greg Lowe on December 8, 2008 to keep his criticisms
regarding the IEN to himself or "Syringa would never get any of the IEN business." (R. pp.
1124, 1168.)
The ENA technical proposal was rated the best by the evaluation team. In spite of the
fact that Purchasing Administrator Bums had not made the required findings before contracts
could be issued to multiple bidders (see Idaho Code § 67-5718A), Mark Little, who reports to
Mr. Gwartney, announced that DOA would make a multiple award after learning that Qwest did
not receive the highest technical score.

Mr. Little did so without even opening the cost

proposals. (See section l.C.6., Statement of Facts, supra).
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Mr. Little testified that he announced a multiple award would be made because the
evaluation team had recommended a multiple award, but multiple members of the evaluation
team denied making such a recommendation. (R. Conf. pp. 123-138.)
Mr. Gwartney's direct connection to the pretext of the multiple award is evidenced by his
deposition testimony and the testimony of Qwest employee Clint Berry. Mr. Gwartney twice
testified that he knew as of January 16, 2009 (the day the award was announced), that Qwest was
going to be the backbone provider. (R. Conf. pp. 90-92, Gwartney Depo., p. 153, L. 15 - p. 160,
L. 8; R. Conf. pp. 371, p. 259, L. 13 and p. 266, L. 19.) Mr. Berry also testified that he "knew all
along" Qwest was going to provide connectivity. (R. Con£ p. 440, Berry Depo., p. 163, L. 5 - p.
165,L.12.)
In addition, evidence from sources and witnesses other than Mr. Gwartney document that
he met with Qwest employee Jim Schmidt on January 30, 2011. Mr. Gwartney's calendar for
this time period (January and February 2009), unlike subsequent months beginning with
March 1, is clean and devoid of any appointments, suggesting it has been altered. The contents
of Mr. Gwartney' s laptop were also deleted during the pendency of this litigation, suggesting the
destruction of evidence (R.1991-2011, Affidavit of Merlyn Clark). (R. Conf. pp. 324-362; see

also R. Conf. pp. 375-377, Gwartney Depa., pp. 287, L. 4 - p. 298, L. 3.) Further, the final IE>r
work assignment by the amended SBPOs constituted an unlawful split award in violation of
Idaho Code§ 67-5718A and evidence of "criminal intent" within the meaning of the Idaho Tort
Claims Act.
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A jury should be allowed to determine whether Mr. Gwartney and Mr. Berry knew on
January 16, 2009 that Qwest was going to get the connectivity work no matter how the proposals
were ranked. A finder of fact could reasonably conclude from the above facts that the multiple
award was pretext, that the amended SBPOs violated LC.§ 67-5718A and that Mr. Gwartney,
with the assistance of Mr. Zickau, wrongfully and unlawfully subverted the competitive bidding
process in violation of the law and with ill will toward Syringa. The entry of summary judgment
was error.

E.

The District Court Erred in Determining as a Matter of Law that Syringa
had Failed to Establish its Tortious Interference Claims Against Qwest

Count Four of the Syringa Complaint alleges that Qwest intentionally interfered with the
Teaming Agreement between ENA and Syringa. Court Five alleges Syringa had a prospective
economic advantage because it was a part of the vendor team that the DOA determined was the
lowest responsible bidder for the proposed IEN network and that Qwest wrongfully interfered
with that prospective economic advantage. The district court erroneously dismissed both counts.
1.

The District Court Applied the Wrong Standard to Syringa's
Interference with Contract Claim

The district court granted summary judgment on Count Four (the interference with
contract claim) because the court erroneously concluded that the Teaming Agreement was not an
enforceable agreement. The district court erred further by applying a wrongful conduct standard
to the interference with contract claim, by failing to evaluate the evidence in the record in light of
the proper allocation of the burden of proof and by failing to recognize the existence of genuine
issues of material fact.
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The district court erroneously dismissed Syringa's interference claims, stating: "For
either tortious interference with contract or prospective economic advantage, the plaintiff must
demonstrate some improper or wrongful conduct, not just intentional interference." (R. p. 2591,
Memo. Dec. Re: Motions for Summary Judgment (emphasis added).) The district court then
concluded that "Syringa has failed to demonstrate that there was any improper or wrongful
conduct on the part of Qwest to support a claim oftortious interference." (R. p. 2592.)
The district court applied the wrong standard and misallocated the burden of proof by
stating that Syringa failed to prove improper or wrongful conduct as to Syringa's interference
with contract claim. The tort of interference with contract puts the burden on the interferer to
establish "justification." Barlow, 95 Idaho at 893, 522 P.2d at 1114; see also Wesco Autobody

Supply, Inc. v. Ernst, 148 Idaho 881, 895, 243 P.3d 1069, 1083 (2010); Autobody Supply, Inc. v.
Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 895, 243 P.2d 1069, 1083 (2010) (quoting Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251,
259, 178 P.3d 616, 624 (2008)); NW Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 841, 41
P.3d 263, 269 (2002); Bliss Valley, 121 Idaho at 284, 824 P.2d at 859. Syringa did not, as the
district court erroneously stated, have the burden of proving that Qwest's conduct was wrongful.
Whether a party's interference with a contract is "justified" depends upon the facts of
each case and, when the action is to be tried to a jury, it is "ordinarily for the jury to determine
whether the interference of the defendant was justified." Barlow, 95 Idaho at 893, 522 P.2d at
1114; see also Bliss Valley, 121 Idaho at 284, 824 P.2d at 859.
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2.

Qwest Failed to Establish Its Interference Was Justified

There is no dispute that Qwest knew a Teaming Agreement existed. Moreover, the
record demonstrates that Qwest intentionally interfered with the Teaming Agreement by, among
other things, meeting with ENA to set prices for Qwest connectivity, encouraging ENA to
withdraw and become a subcontractor of Qwest, requesting and engaging in ex parte meetings
with ENA and the DOA, submitting the Qwest Amendment assigning all of the connectivity
work to it; and, accepting the amended SBPO to provide all the connectivity services work that
ENA had contractually agreed to acquire from Syringa.
Idaho Code Section 67-5726(3) provides that no officer or employee shall conspire with a
vendor or its agent and no vendor or its agent shall conspire with an officer or employee of the
state to influence or attempt to influence the award of a state contract or to deprive or attempt to
deprive a vendor of an acquisition award. This statute reflects the strong public policy that it is
inappropriate and unlawful for a vendor to interfere with the public bidding process. In light of
this public policy, it is hard to identify any justification for Qwest's interference with the
Teaming Agreement that resulted in depriving Syringa's interest in the SBPO awarded to ENA.
Syringa presented evidence that creates genuine issues of material fact as to each of the
elements of its prima facie case. The burden, therefore, shifted to Qwest to prove "justification"
under all of the facts and circumstances of the case. Qwest did not establish, as a matter of law
that its interference was justified. Qwest's justification is, on the record in this case, a disputed
issue of fact.
The district court erred by dismissing Count Four of Syringa' s complaint.
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3.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Whether Qwest Wrongfully
Interfered with Syringa's Prospective Economic Advantage

In contrast to the tort of interference with contract, the prima facie elements of the tort of
interference with prospective economic advantage are: "(l) the existence of a valid economic
expectancy, (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional
interference inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrong by some
measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose
expectancy has been disrupted." Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205,
216 (2008).
Wrongful interference "may by shown by proof that either: (1) the defendant had an
improper objective or purpose to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means
to cause injury to the prospective business relationship." Id. Conduct can be \\'Tongful where the
means used to cause injury violate a statute or other regulation, a recognized rule of common
law, or an established standard of trade or profession. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129
Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 416, 423 (1996).
Although the standard under this tort is different from the "justification" requirement
applicable to the interference with contract claim, genuine issues of material fact nevertheless
exist on this issue. As noted above, there is direct evidence that Qwest demanded and engaged
in closed doors meetings with the state and with ENA after the issuance of the Letter of Intent,
pressured ENA to withdraw and become a subcontractor to Qwest, and provided language for an
amended SBPO that split the IEN project into two contracts for dissimilar services, including a
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telecommunications contract for itself in violation ofldaho Code § 67-5718A. (See Statement of
Facts§§ 10, 12, 13, 14.)
These facts support an inference that Qwest and Mr. Berry always knew Qwest was
"going to provide connectivity" because it intentionally interfered with the competitive bid
process and with Syringa's interest in the award and in the original SBPO 1309 issued to ENA.
(R. Conf. 440, Berry Depo., p. 163, L. 5

F.

p. 165, L. 12.)

Attorneys Fees Are Not Recoverable by Qwest Under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)

The district court erred in granting attorneys' fees to Qwest under Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3).
A district court may award a prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees in a civil action
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) only where a commercial transaction took place between the
parties. Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242, 254 P.3d 1238, 1245-46 (2011);

Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., No. 37563-2010, 2011 WL 5966883, *9 (Idaho Nov. 30, 2011);
Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 256 P.3d 730, 734-35 (2011); BECO Constr., Inc. v. J-U-B
Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008).
Moreover, where a plaintiff never alleged that a commercial transaction took place
between the plaintiff and a particular defendant, that prevailing defendant cannot recover
attorneys' fees under LC. § 12-120(3). Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 2011 WL 5966883 (citing

Jacklin Land Co., Inc., 151 Idaho 242, 254 P.3d at 1245-46). See also Soignier v. Fletcher, 151
Idaho 322, 256 P.3d at 734-35
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No commercial transaction is alleged between Syringa and Qwest in this case.

The

commercial transaction at issue was the Teaming Agreement between Syringa and Defendant
ENA, to which Qwest was not a party. Syringa sought relief against Qwest for the tort of
interfering with its commercial transactions with others; not with Qwest. Therefore, Qwest is not
entitled to recover attorneys' fees pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3). See Sadid, 2011 WL 5966883 at
*9; Jacklin Land, 151 Idaho 242, 254 P.3d at 1245-46.
The district court decision awarding attorneys' fees to Qwest should be reversed.
G.

Syringa May Recover Its Costs and Attorneys Fees on Appeal from ENA

Syringa has not appealed from the award of attorneys' fees to ENA under Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3) because it was involved in a commercial transaction with ENA. In the event Syringa
prevails on this appeal, it is entitled to its costs and attorneys' fees from ENA pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3), and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The record contains more than sufficient evidence to create a triable issue concerning the
enforceability of the Teaming Agreement and breach by ENA. This evidence includes, but is not
limited to, the Teaming Agreement, the pricing and technical information provided to ENA by
Syringa for use in the RFP, the testimony of multiple witnesses, including Bob Collie, who said
ENA would do "whatever the state wanted," and ENA's acceptance of an amended SBPO that
excluded Syringa from the work assigned to it under the Teaming Agreement.
The record also demonstrates at least two violations of Idaho Code §67-5718A. These
violations arise as a result of 1) the issuance of multiple SBPOs on January 28 and February 26,
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2009 without advance written documentation that the conditions of the statute were satisfied; and
2) the requirement that the contractors ENA and Qwest provide dissimilar services and act as
"equal partners" on the IEN Project.

No administrative remedies exist concerning these

violations that Syringa was required to exhaust.
The record contains abundant evidence supporting the inference that Mike Gwartney
unlawfully directed that Qwest would provide telecommunications connectivity services for the
IEN project, caused the issuance of the January 28, 2009 multiple awards to keep second place
Qwest on the project for that purpose and ultimately directed that Qwest be designated as the
exclusive contractor for connectivity, cutting out Syringa. The testimony of DOA witnesses
Mr. Gwartney, Mr. Zickau, Little and Hill concerning the reasons for making a multiple award
and issuing the amended SBPOs that eliminated Syringa from the IEN Project is so vague and so
strongly contradicted that it raises issues concerning their credibility and supports an inference
that the reasons given are pretext. Further, the testimony of Mr. Gwartney directly supports the
conclusion that he intended, consistent with the testimony of Qwest employee Clint Berry, for
Qwest to provide IEN telecommunications services at the time of the January 16, 2009 postevaluation telephone call with Mr. Zickau and Ms. Luna. (R. Conf. pp. 90-92, Gwartney Depo.,
p. 153, L. 15
p. 262, L. 8

p. 160, L. 8; R. Conf. p. 371, p. 259, L. 13 - p. 261, L. 19; R. Conf. p. 371,
p. 263, L. 23.) This same evidence supports the inference that Mr. Zickau knew

of Mr. Gwartney's intentions from and after January 16, 2009 and participated.
The record further indicates direct efforts by Qwest to interfere with the Teaming
Agreement and with Syringa's prospective economic opportunity, including a combination with
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ENA to reach a post award agreement in price and its attempts to persuade ENA to become a
subcontractor by withholding material information that DOA had selected ENA as its E-Rate
provider.
For each of the foregoing reasons, the district court decisions granting Defendants'
motions for summary judgment dismissing Count Two, Count Three, Count Four, and Count
Five of Syringa' s Complaint should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

In

addition, the district court decision awarding attorneys' fees to Qwest should be reversed, the
award of attorneys fees to ENA should be vacated pending further proceedings, and this Court
should award Syringa its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees from ENA incurred in bringing this
appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _Way of February, 2012.
GIVENS PURSLEY

{rJ
I

By:
David R. Lombardi
Amber N. Dina
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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2008 Idaho Laws Ch. 260 (H.B. 543)

2008 Idaho Laws Ch. 260 (H.B. 543)
IDAHO 2008 SESSION LAWS
SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF THE 59IB LEGISLATURE
2315
Additions are indicated by - ; deletions by

±fft. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted.
Vetoed provisions within tabular material an: not displayed.
Ch. 260
H.B. No. 543
EDUCATION-FUNDS-IDAHO EDUCATION NETWORK
AN ACT RELATING TO THE IDAHO EDUCATION NETWORK; STATING LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS;
AMENDING SECTION 33-125, IDAHO CODE, TO REQUIRE TIIE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
TO PERFORM THE DlHIES ASSIGNED TO IT RELATING TO 1HE IDAHO EDUCATION NETWORK;
AND AMENDING CHAPTER 57, TITLE 67, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION
67-5745D, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS, TO DEFINE "IDAHO EDUCATION
NETWORK (JEN)," TO PROVIDE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT OF TIIE IDAHO EDUCATION
NETWORK BY 11IE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, TO SPECIFY DUTIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION INCLUDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOALS AND PLAN OF THE
IDAHO EDUCATION NETWORK, TO SPECIFY DUTIES OF IBE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
TO PROVIDE FOR MANAGEMENT OF SITE OPERATIONS AND TO CREATE TIIE IDAHO EDUCATION
NETWORK FUND.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State ofldaho:
SECTION l. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS. The Legislature finds that:
(1) High-bandwidth connectivity is an essential component of education infrastructure in the 21st century;
(2) Idaho is behind in the use of high-bandwidth connectivity and technology to deliver edocational opportunities to
students and teachers;
(3) High-bandwidth connectivity and technology can enable advanced and specialized coun;es to be shared within or
among school districts and allow students access to concurrent emollment offered by higher education; and
(4) A common high-bandwidth connectivity and technology platform will enable scarce educational resources to be
shared throughout the state.
SECTION 2. That Section 33--125, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:
<<ID ST§ 33--125 >>

§ 33-125. State department of education-Creation-Duties
There is hereby established as an executive agency of the state board of education a department known as the state
department of education. The state superintendent shall serve as the executive officer of such department and shall
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have the responsibility for carrying out policies, procedures and duties authorized by law or established by the state
board of education for all elementary and secondary school matters, and to administer
ts for the omotion of
science education as rovided in sections 33-128 and 33-129, Idaho Code.
SECTION 3. That Chapter 57, Title 67, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended by the addition thereto of
a NEW SECTION, to be known and designated as Section 67-5745D, Idaho Code, and to read as follows:
<<ID ST § 67-5745D >>
§ 67-5745D. Idaho education network

( l) The legislature finds that:
(a) Idaho does not have a statewide coordinated and funded high-bandwidth education network;
(b) Such a network will enable required and advanced courses, concurrent enrollment and teacher training to be deliverable to all public high schools through an efficiently-managed statewide infrastructure; and
(c) Aggregating and leveraging demand at the statewide level will provide overall benefits and efficiencies in the
procurement of telecommunications services, including high-bandwidth connectivity, internet access, purchases of
equipment, federal subsidy program expertise and other related services.
(2) As used in this section, "Idaho Education Network (IEN)" means the coordinated, statewide telecommunications
distnbution system for distance learning for each public school, including two-way interactive video, data, internet
access and other telecommunications services for providing distance learning. The term also includes connections to
each institution of higher education and other locations as necessary to facilitate distance education, teacher training
and other related services.
(3) The department of administration shall provide administrative oversight for IEN.
(4) In performing the duties under this section, the department of administration shall consider the following goals to
ensure that:
(a) Idaho will utilize technology to facilitate comparable access to educational opportunities for all students;
(b) Idaho will be a leader in the use of technology to deliver advanced high school curricula, concurrent college credit,
and ongoing teacher training on an equitable basis throughout the state; and
(c) Idaho will leverage its statewide purchasing power for the IEN to promote private sector investment in telecommunications infrastructure that will benefit other technology applications such as telemedicine, telecommuting, telegovernment and economic development.
(5) In performing the duties under this section, subject to the availability of funds, the department of administration
shall:
(a) Coordinate the development, outsourcing and implementation of a statewide network for education, which shall
include high-bandwidth connectivity, two-way interactive video and internet access, using primarily fiber optic and
other high-bandwidth transmission media;
(b) Consider statewide economic development impacts in the design and implementation of the educational telecommunications infrastructure;
( c) Coordinate and support the telecommunications needs, other than basic voice communications of public education;
(d) Procure high-quality, cost-effective internet access and appropriate interface equipment to public education facilities;
(e) Procure telecommunications services and equipment on behalf of public education;
(f) Procure and implement technology and equipment for the delivery of distance learning;
(g) In conjunction with the state department of education, apply for state and federal funding for technology on behalf
of IEN services;
(h) Procure telecommunications services and equipment for the lEN through an open and competitive bidding process;
(i) Work with the private sector to deliver high-quality, cost-effective services statewide; and
U) Cooperate with state and local governmental and educational entities and provide leadership and consulting for
telecommunications for education.
(6) The department of administration shall follow an implementation plan that:
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(a) In the first phase, will connect each public high school with a scalable, high-bandwidth connection, including
connectiorn; to each institution of higher education as necessary, thereby allowing any location on JEN to share educational resources with any other location;
(b) Upon completion of the first phase, shall provide that each public high school will be served with high-bandwidth
connectivity, internet access and equipment in at least one (1) two-way interactive video classroom; and
(c) In subsequent phases, will evaluate and make recommendatiorn; to the legislature for:
(i) Connectivity to each elementary and middle school;
(ii) The addition oflibraries to the IEN; and
(iii) The migration of state agency locations from current technology and services.
(7) Under the direction of the state superintendent of public imtruction, the state department of education shall:
(a) Coordinate with the state board of education and school districts to distribute telecourses, teleconferences and other
imtructional and training services to and between public schools;
(b) Coordinate with the state board of education and imtitutions of higher education to distribute college credit telecourses, teleconferences and other imtructional and training services;
(c) Act as a clearinghouse for the materials, courses, publications and other applicable information related to the
requirements of this section; and
(d) Coordinate all e-rate funding applicatiorn; for Idaho's school districts and implement e-rate funds, through the
department of administration, for related services provided under the purview of the JEN.
(8) Educational imtitutions served by the IEN shall manage site operations under policy established by the department
of administration.
(9) Idaho education network fund. There is hereby created in the state treasury the Idaho education network fund.
Moneys in the fund shall corn;ist of funds received from state appropriatiorn;, grants, federal moneys, donations or
funds from any other source. Moneys in the fund may be expended, pursuant to appropriation, for implementation and
ongoing costs of the Idaho education network. The treasurer shall invest all idle moneys in the fund. Any interest
earned on the investment of idle moneys shall be returned to the fund.
Approved on the 25th day of March, 2008.
Effective: July 1, 2008.
Statement of Purpose
RS 17910Cl
The purpose of this legislation is to enable the Department of Administration to start the process of implementing a
statewide education network. This legislation would also create a place for funds when available for the continued
development of the Idaho Education Network.
Fiscal Note
No impact on the General Fund.
Contact Name: Rep. Bob Nonini Rep. Wills Sen. Goedde
Phone: {208) 332-1000 Rep. Snodgrass Sen. Cameron
Rep. Bell Rep. Rusche Sen. Jorgenson
Rep. Anderson Rep. Ruchti Sen. Keough
Rep. Henderson Rep. Sayler Sen. Richardson
Rep. Bedke Rep. Bock Sen. Hammond
Rep. Bolz Rep. Smith(30) Sen Langhorst
Rep. Bradford Rep. Durst
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Rep.Eskridge
Rep. Shirley
Rep. Nielsen
Tom Luna, Superintendent of Public Instruction
Mike Gwartney, Director, Department of Administration
ID LEGIS 260 (2008)
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END OF DOCUMENT
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Title 67. State Government and State Affairs
.._ Chagter 57. Department of Administration
...... § 67-5716. Definitions of terms
<Text of section effective July I, 2013. See, also, section 67-5716 effective until July I, 2013.>
(1) Acquisition. The process of procuring or purchasing property by the state ofldaho.
(2) Procurement. Obtaining property for state use by lease, rent, or any manner other than by purchase or gift
(3) Property. Goods, services, parts, supplies and equipment, both tangible and intangible, including, but nonexclusively, designs, plans, programs, systems, techniques and any rights and interests in such property.
(4) Goods. Items of personal property, not qualifying as equipment, parts or supplies.
(5) Services. Personal services, in excess of personnel regularly employed for whatever duration and/or covered by
personnel system standards, for which bidding is not prohibited or made impractical by statute, rules or generally
accepted ethical practices.

(6) Parts. Items of personal property acquired for repair or replacement of unserviceable existing items.
(7) Supplies. Items of personal property having an expendable quality or during their normal use are consumed and
which require or suggest acquisition in bulk.

(8) Equipment Items of personal property which have a normal useful life expectancy of two (2) or more years.
(9) Component. An item of property normally assembled with other items into a unified productive whole at the site of
use, which items belong to functional classes that may be interchangeable units of similar function but differing operational or productive capabilities.
(IO) Vendor. A person or entity capable of supplying property to the state.
(11) Bidder. A vendor who has submitted a bid on a specific item or items of property to be acquired by the state.
(12) Lowest responsible bidder. The responsible bidder whose bid reflects the lowest acquisition price to be paid by
the state; except that when specifications are valued or comparative performance examinations are conducted, the
results of such examinations and the relative score of valued specifications will be weighed, as set out in the specifications, in determining the lowest acquisition price.
(13) Contractor. A bidder who has been awarded on acquisition contract.
( 14) Agency. All officers, departments, divisions, bureaus, boards, commissions and institutions of the state, including
the public utilities commission, but excluding other legislative and judicial branches of government, and excluding the
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governor, the lieutenant governor, the secretary of state, the state controller, the state treasurer, the attorney general,
and the superintendent of public instruction.
( 15) Bid. A written offer to perform a contract to purchase or supply property or services in response to an invitation
for bid or request for proposal.
( 16) Recyclable. Materials that still have useful physical, chemical or biological properties after serving their original
purposes and can. therefore, be reasonably reused or recycled for the same or other purposes.
{17) Recycled-content product. A product containing postconsumer waste and/or secondary waste as defined in this
section.
{18) Postconsumer waste. A finished material which would normally be disposed of as a solid waste, having completed its life cycle as a consumer item.
(19) Secondary waste. Fragments of products or finished products of a manufacturing process, which has converted a
virgin resource into a commodity of real economic value and may include a postconsumer waste.
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Title 67. State Government and State Affairs
"ii Chapter 57. Department of Administration
-+-+ § 67-57IBA. Acquisition of property by contract--Award to more than one bidder--Standards for

multiple awards-Approval by administrator
(I) Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter to the contrary, the administrator of the division of purchasing may
make an award of a contract to two (2) or more bidders to furnish the same or similar property where more than one (1)
contractor is necessary:
(a) To furnish the types of property and quantities required by state agencies;
(b) To provide expeditious and cost-efficient acquisition of property for state agencies; or
(c) To enable state agencies to acquire property which is compatible with property previously acquired.
(2) No award of a contract to multiple bidders shall be made under this section unless the administrator of the division
of purchasing makes a written determination showing that multiple awards satisfy one ( 1) or more of the criteria set
forth in this section.
(3) Where a contract for property has been awarded to two (2) or more bidders in accordance ~ith this section, a state
agency shall make purchases from the contractor whose terms and conditions regarding price, availability, support
services and delivery are most advantageous to the agency.
(4) A multiple award of a contract for property under this section shall not be made when a single bidder can reasonably serve the acquisition needs of state agencies. A multiple award of a contract shall on1y be made to the number
of bidders necessary to serve the acquisition needs of state agencies.
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Title 67. State Government and State Affairs
''li Chapter 57. Department of Administration
-+-+ § 67-5726. Prohibitions
(1) No contract or order or any interest therein shall be transferred by the contractor or vendor to whom such contract
or order is given to any other party, without the approval in writing of the administrator. Transfer ofa contract without
apProval shall cause the annulment of the contract so transferred, at the option of the state. All rights of action,
however, for any breach of such contract by the contracting parties are reserved to the state. No member of the legislature or any officer or employee of any branch of the state government shall directly, himself, or by any other person
in trust for him or for bis use or benefit or on his account, undertake, execute, hold or enjoy, in whole or in part, any
contract or agreement made or entered into by or on behalf of the state ofldaho, if made by, through, or on behalf of
the department in which he is an officer or employee; or if made by, through or on behalf of any other department
unless the same is made after competitive bids.

(2) Except as provided by section 67-5718, Idaho Code, oo officer or employee shall influence or attempt to influence
the award ofa contract to a particular vendor, QT to deprive or attempt to deprive any vendor of an acquisition contract.
(3) No officer or employee shall conspire with a vendor or its agent, and no vendor or its agent shall conspire with an
officer or employee, to influence or attempt to influence the award of a contract, or to deprive or attempt to deprive a
vendor of an acquisition award.
(4) No officer or employee shall fail to utilize an open contract without justifiable cause for such action. No officer or
employee shall accept property which he knows does not meet specifications or substantially meet the original performance test results.
(5) Deprivation, influence or attempts thereat shall not include written reports, based upon substantial evidence, sent lo
the administrator of the division of purchasing concerning matters relating to the responsibility of vendon;.
(6) No vendor or related party, or subsidiary, or affiliate of a vendor may submit a bid to obtain a contract to provide
property to the state, if the vendor or related party, or affiliate or subsidiary was paid for services utilized in preparing
the bid specifications or if the services influenced the procurement process.
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Title 67. State Government and State Affairs
~ Chapter 57. Department of Administration

,.. ,.. § 67-5733. Division of purchasing--Appeals
(1) (a) There shall be, beginning with the dayofreceipt ofnotice, a period of not more than ten(lO) working clays in
which any vendor, qualified and able to sell or supply the items to be acquired, may notify in writing the administrator of the division of purchasing of his intention to challenge the specifications and shall specifically state the
exact nature of his challenge. The specific challenge shall describe the location of the challenged portion or clause in
the specification document, unless the challenge concerns an omission, explain why any provision should be struck,
added or altered, and contain suggested corrections.

Upon receipt of the challenge, the administrator of the division of purchasing shall either deny the challenge, and
such denial shall be considered the final agency decision, or he shall present the matter to the director of the department of administration for appointment of a determinations officer. If the director of the department of administration appoints a determinations officer, then all vendors, who are invited to bid on the property sought to be
acquired, shall be notified of the appeal and the appointment of determinations officer and may indicate in writing
their agreement or disagreement with the challenge within five (5) days. The notice to the vendors may be electronic. Any vendor may note his agreement or disagreement with the challenge. The determinations officer may, on
his own motion, refer the challenge portion and any related portions of the challenge to the author of the specification to be rewritten with the advice and comments of the vendors capable of supplying the property; rewrite the
specification himself and/or reject all or any part of any challenge. If specifications are to be rewritten, the matter
shall be continued until the determinations officer makes a final determination of the acceptability of the revised
specifications.
The administrator shall reset the bid opening no later than fifteen ( 15) days after final determination of challenges or
the amendment of the specifications. If the administrator denies the challenge, then the bid opening date shall not be
reset.
The final decision of the determinations officer or administrator on the challenge to specifications shall not be
considered a contested case within the meaning of the administrative procedure act; provided that a vendor disagreeing with specifications may include such disagreement as a reason for asking for appointment of a determinations officer pursuant to section 67-5733(l)(c), Idaho Code.
(b) There shall be, beginning with the day following receipt of notice of rejection, a period of five (5) working clays
in which a bidder whose bid was found nonresponsive may appeal such decision to the director of the department of
administration. A nonresponsive bid, within the meaning of this chapter, is a bid which does not comply with the bid
invitation and specifications and shall not apply to a vendor whose bid is considered but who is determined not to be
the lowest responsible bidder as defined in this chapter. The director shall:

(i) Deny the application; or
(ii) Appoint a determinations officer to review the record and submit a recommended order to the director to affirm or reverse the administrator's decision of bid nonresponsiveness.
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The director shall, upon receipt of a written recommendation from the determinations officer, sustain, modify or
reverse the administrator's nonresponsive bid decision. An appeal conducted under the provisions of this subsection
shall not be considered a contested case and shall not be subject to judicial review under the provisions of chapter
52, title 67, Idaho Code.
(c) A vendor whose bid is considered may, within five ( 5) working days following receipt of notice that he is not the
lowest responsible bidder, apply to the director of the department of administration for appointment of a determinations officer. The application shall set forth in specific terms the reasons why the administrator's decision is
thought to be erroneous. Upon receipt of the application, the director shall within three (3) working days:
(i) Deny the application, and such denial shall be considered the final agency decision; or
(ii) Appoint a determinations officer to review the record to determine whether the administrator's selection of the
lowest responsible bidder is correct; or
(iii) Appoint a determinations officer with authority to conduct a contested case hearing in accordance with the
provisions of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
A determinations officer appointed pursuant to section 67-5733(l)(c)(ii), Idaho Code, shall inform the director by
written recommendation whether, in his opinion, the administrator's selection of the lowest responsible bidder is
correct. The determinations officer in making this recommendation may rely on the documents of record, statements
of employees of the state of Idaho participating in any phase of the selection process, and statements of any vendor
submitting a bid. A contested case hearing shall not be allowed and the determinations officer shall not be required
to solicit statements from any person. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the determinations officer, the
director shall sustain, modify or reverse the decision of the administrator on the selection of the lowest responsible
bidder or the director may appoint a determinations officer pursuant to section 67-5733(1)(c)(iii), Idaho Code.
A determinations officer appointed pursuant to section 67-5733(l)(cXiii), Idaho Code, shall conduct a contested
case hearing and upon conclusion of the hearing shall prepare findings of fact, conclusions oflaw and a recommended order for the director of the department of administrntion. Upon receipt of the findings of fact, conclusions
of law and recommended order, the director shall enter a final order sustaining, modifying or reversing the decision
of the administrator on the selection of the lowest responsible bidder.
(d) In the case of a sole source procurement, there shall be a period of not more than five (5) working days from the
last date of public notice in which any vendor, able to sell or supply the item(s) to be acquired, may notify the administrator of the division of purchasing, in writing, ofhis intention to challenge the sole source procurement and
briefly explain the nature of the challenge.
Upon receipt of the challenge, the director shall either:
(i) Deny the application; or
(ii) Appoint a determinations officer to review the record and submit a recommended order to the director to affirm or reverse the administrator's sole source determination.
The director shall, upon receipt of a written recommendation from the determinations officer, sustain, modify or
reverse the administrator's sole source determination. An appeal conducted under the provisions of this subsection
shall not be considered a contested case and shall not be subject to judicial review under the provisions of chapter
52, title 67, Idaho Code.
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(e) The administrator of the division of purchasing may, on his own initiative, file a complaint with the director for
a hearing before a determinations officer. The director shall appoint a determinations officer who shall make written
recommendations to the director and the director shall render whatever decision is necessary to resolve the complaint.
(2) The director of the department of administration is hereby authorized and directed to appoint a determinations
officer whenever one is required by this chapter. The officer shall meet and render whatever determination is called
for. When a complaint is filed pursuant to section 67-5733(l)(b), Idaho Code, no bid may be awarded until the final
decision is rendered by the director of the department of administration; provided that in all other cases where a determinations officer is appointed by the director, the director shall have the power to allow the acquisition contract to
be awarded to the successful bidder prior to or after the decision of the determinations officer if he determines such
award to be in the best interest of the state. Any determinations officer appointed pursuant to this section shall exist
only for the duration of unresolved complaints on an acquisition and shall be dismissed upon resolution of all such
complaints. The determinations officer shall be guided in his detennination by the best economic interests of the state
for both the near future and more extended periods of time. In addition to the powers conferred on the detenninations
officer, the director of the department ofadministration may: impose the penalty prescribed by section 67-5734(3),
Idaho Code; enjoin any activity which violates this chapter; direct that bids be rejected, or sustained; direct that specifications be rejected, sustained or modified; and direct further legal action.
(3) Challenges or appeals conducted pursuant to section 67-5733(l)(a), (l)(b), (l)(c)(i) or (l)(c)(ii), Idaho Code, shall
not be considered to be a contested case as that term is defined in the administrative procedure act An appeal conducted pursuant to section 67-5733(1)(c)(iii), Idaho Code, shall be conducted as a contested case according to the
provisions of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
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TEAMING AGREEMENT
This teaming agreemenl is dated January 7, 2009 between Education Networkl of America, Inc., a Delaware
corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary ENA Services, LLC, a Delaware limited liability corporation
(collectively "ENA"), and Syring• Networkl, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company("~").

1. Def"lnlrions
(a) Confidenlial Information. ''Confidcmia! Information" meallll any infonnation that is not generally
available to the public, whether of a technical, business, or other nature and that the receiving party knows or has
reason to know is confidential, proprietary, or trade secret infonnation of the: disclosing party. Confidential
btformation includes the Proposal and the terms of this agreement. Confidential btformalion does not include
information that is in the public domain through oo breach of this Agreement by the receiving party or that is
already known or is independently developed by the receiving party.

(b) Prime Contract. "Prime Contract" means the resullant contract(s) between ENA and/or Syringa with the
State ofldaho regarding the Project.
(c) ProjKt. "~" means that certain request for proposal, request for quotation, invitation for bid, or
similar invitation for (i) the provision of products or services in connection with the State of Idaho Request for
Proposal #RFP02J60 to construct the Idaho Education Network ("JEN") end (ii) services provided under the
Prime Contract.
(d) l'roposal. "Proposal" means the wrinen response to the Project.
(e) Syriuga Members. "Svringa Members" refers to the companies that are members and owners ofSyringa
Networ.lcs, LLC upon execution of thi3 Agrcc:ment.

2. Teaming
(a) Purpose. ENA is seeking to become either {i) the prime contractor for the Project or (ii) the prime
contractor for the portion of the Project which provides all services to schools and libraries. If ENA or Syringa
arc awarded the Prime Contract, ENA and Syringa &hall enter into an agreement pursuant to which Syringa shall
provide connectivity services statewide to ENA. The purpose ohhis agreement is to define the parties' respective
rights and obligations in connection with the Proposal, the Project, and the Prime Contract.

(b) Re11tlousblp. The parties agree that, as between the parties, ENA will be the prime contractor for either
(i) the Project or (ii) the prime contractor for the portion of the Project wich provides all services 10 schools and
libraries, and, if ENA wins the Prime Contract, Syringa will provide ronnectivity services in connection with the
Project. The parties are and will be independent conuactors with respect to this agreement and !he Project.
(c) Proposal. ENA shall assume the lead role in preparing the Proposal. Syringa shal1 provide such input,
review and information into the Proposal as is required to complete all requirements of the Request for Proposal.
(d) Communications. As between the parties, ENA will assume the lead role for external communications
regarding the Project and the Proposal, unless mutually agreed to by both parties. Syringa shall promptly notify
ENA and obtain ENA 's authorization prior to any response by Syringa in the event the customer or any employee
or officer of the executive or legislative branch of the Slate of Idaho contacts Syringa or vice-versa concerning the
Proposal.
(e) Joint Partfdpatioo. Neither party shall participate in efforts related to submitting a Proposal, whether by
itself as a prime contractor or with another party, independently of the other party without the other party's prior
written consent. Nothing in this agreement however, is intended to preclude either party from fulfilling its
existing obligations, or from independently submitting proposals or performing work, unn::lated to the Project.
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(t) Eu1tlag •od Future Customer Relationships. Nothing in this agreement is intended to preclude either
party from fulfilling its existing obligations to provide service Wldcr existing contracts or service agreements with
customers that may be eligible to receive service under the Project regardless if such obligations may be in
conflict with Section 2(e) above. Neither party shall enter into a new contraet or future arnngemcnt with any
customer that may be eligible to receive service wider the Project without written approval of the other party,
which shall not be unreasonably withheld should the requesting party be able to prove that such a contract or
service arrangement will not be entered into in bad faith to the goals of the Project or the other party.
(g) Coaftdeotiality. Neither party shall disclose to any third party, or wsc for any pwpose other than in
furtherance ofENA's efforts to win the Prime Contract, any Confidential lnfonnation vf the other party.
(h) Termination. This agreement will terminate without liability upon any of the following events:

(i) the customer formally and finally rejects the Proposal or cancels the Project;
(ii) Either party notifies the other that it is ceasing its efforts with respect to the Project, however such a
notification shall not absolve either party of its obligations under Section 2( e) and l(g) above;
(iii)the anniversary of this agreement in the absence of an award, extension, cancellation, or withdrawal
of the Project;
(iv) mutual written agreement of the parties; or
(v) execution of the service agreement contemplated in Section 3(a) below.

3. Service Ai=reemeot
(a) Gener.Uy. If ENA wins the Prime Contract as provided in Section 2(a) above, the parties shall e~ecute a
partnership agreement as specified in this agreement that will also include any required flow-down provisions or
other appropriate temlS similar to those set forth in the Prime Contract.
(b) ENA Responsibilities. If ENA wins the Project as provided in Section 2(a) above, in connection with
perfonning the Prime Contract, ENA shall be responsible for the following functions for all participating schools
and libraries: (i) procuring and owning all customer premises equipment, (ii) coordinating field service, (iii)
managing the customer relationship, (iv) serving as the fiscal and contracting agent, including responsibility for
invoicing and collections, (v) management of E-Rate funds, and (vi) procuring, managing, and provisioning last
mile circuits.

(c) Syriui:a RespouslblUdes. If ENA wins lhe Project as provided in Section 2.(a) above, in connection with
perfonning the Prime Contract, Syringa shall be responsible for (i) pr<>viding the statewide backbone fur the
services, (ii) providing and operating a network operations center for the backbone, (iii) providing for co-location
of core aetwork equipment, (iv) procuring and owning all customer premises equipment not provided by ENA,
(v) coordinating field service for non-school or library sites, (vi) managing the customer relationship for nonschool or library sites, and (vii) procwing, managing and provisioning last mile circuits for non-school or library
sites.
ln addition, Syringa and Syringa Members shall have the first opportunity and first right of refusal to
provide Jast mile circuits delivered by ENA as part of this Project. ENA shall notify Syringa of all last mile
circuits needed for the Project. Syringa and Syringe Members shall have the first opportunity to provide ENA a
cost estimate, a statement of service and quality requirements of the last mile circuits proposed to be provided by
Syringa or Syringa Members and a time1ine for providing such last mile circuits. After reviewing the Syringa or
Syringa Member proposal(s), ENA may seek proposals from other providers. ENA shall award the contract for
last mile circuits to Syrioga or Syringa Members Wllcss the following conditions are met: (i) such other providers
can provide such last mile circuits meeting or exceeding the quality requirements requCliled by ENA and (ii) such
other providers can provide such last mile circuits at a better price than that proposed by Syringa or Syringa
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Membcn; after Syringa and Syringa Members have an opponunity lo match the lower price p0int or (iii) if the
limeframe for providing such last mile circuits proposed by Syringa ur Syringa Member.I would result in a prime
contnct default for i1111bility to deliver savice in a timely manner. In soliciting proposals from any other
providers, ENA shall mainlain the confidentiality of Syringa or Syringa Members' proposal.
(d) Joint R.espoasibiUties. lfENA wins the Project, in connection with performing the Prime Contract, the

parti5 shall jointly be responsible for (i) leveraging the best price from existing carrier relationships, (ii)
developing adwtional earner relationship for lhe puiposes of this project and (iii) interfacing between last mile
circuits and Syringa 's backbone. Additionally, if selected for the Project, the parties shall also have Project
review meetings, in a location and manner to be agreed upon in advance of the meeting, to ensure successful
execution and high levels of customer satisfaction; such meetings shaJJ occur not less than once per calendar
quarter.
4. General. The parties c:an amend this agreement only by a written agree111Bnt of the parties that identifies
itself as an amendment to this agreement. The parties can waive this agreement only by a writing executed by the
party or parties agaiMt whom the waiver is sought to be enforced. Each party shall pay its own fees and expenses
(including, without limitation, lhe fees and expenses of Its agents, representatives, aUQf'lleys, and accountams)
incurred in connection with the negotiation, drafting, execution, delivery, and perfonnance of this a~cnt and
U1e transactions it contemplates. Neither party may assign any of its rights wider this agreement, except with the
prior written consent of the other party. All assigrunents of rights arc prohibited under the pm:cdi.ng sentence,
whethc:r lhcy 11.re volwitary or involuntary, by merger, consolidation, dissolution, operation of Jaw or any other
manner. Any change of control transaction is deemed an assi1P1Ment herewider. Neither party may delegate any
performance under Ibis agreement. Any pwportcd assignment of rights or delegation of perfonnance in violation
of this agreement is void.
ENA

By: •

SYRING A

~- /l rf}}
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Title:
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